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Underwriting syndicate structure and foreign IPO underpricing: A team production perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Huang, Wenhui
  • Shen, Zhihan
  • Lin, Yu
  • Zhao, Ruocheng

Abstract

Grounded in team production and agency theory, we investigate investment bank opportunism in the context of 466 foreign initial public offerings (IPOs) in U.S. equity markets from 2009 to 2023. Findings reveal that IPO underpricing is higher for foreign firms underwritten by larger and more diverse syndicates owing to concerns about free-riding and moral hazard. Our results are robust to a series of sensitivity tests. Moreover, frequent foreign IPOs by home-country firms and strong home-country legal protection for investors attenuate the positive relationship between underwriting syndicate size and diversity and IPO underpricing. By delineating the collaborative nature of IPO underwriting, this study offers new insights into the implications of syndicate structure for foreign IPO performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Wenhui & Shen, Zhihan & Lin, Yu & Zhao, Ruocheng, 2024. "Underwriting syndicate structure and foreign IPO underpricing: A team production perspective," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 96(PA).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:96:y:2024:i:pa:s1057521924005726
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103640
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Syndicate; IPO underpricing; Teamwork; Underwriter; Opportunism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • M16 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - International Business Administration

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