IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finana/v91y2024ics1057521923004556.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does the pricing of intra-group investment deviate from the market rule? Evidence from domestic merger and acquisition transactions under common control in China

Author

Listed:
  • Wen, Riguang
  • Wang, Siyi
  • Ouyang, Yingting

Abstract

This study examines whether the pricing of intra-group investment deviates from market rules using data on domestic merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions under common control in China. It was found that M&A transactions under common control involve a lower premium than those without common control, which rely on market rules to set a price. This is because acquirers in M&A transactions under common control face a lower degree of information asymmetry than those in M&A transactions without common control. Moreover, this study explores the economic consequences of internal investment behavior from multiple angles. It was found that compared with acquirers in M&A transactions without common control, acquirers in M&A transactions under common control have lower performance in the market, finance, and innovation. This study addresses the research gap on the internal investments of groups and deepens our understanding of investment pricing in internal capital markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Wen, Riguang & Wang, Siyi & Ouyang, Yingting, 2024. "Does the pricing of intra-group investment deviate from the market rule? Evidence from domestic merger and acquisition transactions under common control in China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:91:y:2024:i:c:s1057521923004556
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102939
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521923004556
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102939?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:91:y:2024:i:c:s1057521923004556. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620166 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.