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The parlous state of macroeconomics and the optimal financial structure

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  • Goodhart, C.A.E.

Abstract

Macroeconomics remains in a parlous condition, largely because it has assumed away all financial frictions. Ultimately these latter depend on the possibility that borrowers might default on their repayments. Without default, there is no real role for most financial intermediations, collateral, liquidity or money. Yet default (especially of banks, the key ingredient of crises) is rarely modelled. In order to make banks safer, in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis, there are various proposals to restructure our banking systems, for example to dismantle universal banks into separate retail and investment parts. This partly derives from a mis-reading of the causes of the GFC, which was largely driven by an interaction between a housing boom and a bank credit expansion surfeit, thereby exaggerating leverage, mis-match and non-core bank finance. The need is for regulatory improvements that address these weaknesses.

Suggested Citation

  • Goodhart, C.A.E., 2014. "The parlous state of macroeconomics and the optimal financial structure," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 78-83.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:36:y:2014:i:c:p:78-83
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2014.10.014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Benbouzid, Nadia & Leonida, Leone & Mallick, Sushanta K., 2018. "The non-monotonic impact of bank size on their default swap spreads: Cross-country evidence," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 226-240.
    2. Fontana, Giuseppe & Veronese Passarella, Marco, 2020. "Unconventional monetary policies from conventional theories: Modern lessons for central bankers," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 503-519.
    3. Elgebeily, Eman & Guermat, Cherif & Vendrame, Vasco, 2021. "Managerial optimism and investment decision in the UK," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Default; Liquidity; Money Stock; Great Financial Crisis; Bank Restructuring; Liquidity (Mismatch) Ratio; Ladder of Sanctions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E40 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - General
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation

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