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Optimal screening for genetic diseases

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  • Nævdal, Eric

Abstract

Screening for genetic diseases is performed in many regions and/or ethnic groups where there is a high prevalence of possibly malign genes. The propagation of such genes can be considered a dynamic externality. Given that many of these diseases are untreatable and give rise to truly tragic outcomes, they are a source of societal concern, and the screening process should perhaps be regulated. This paper incorporates a standard model of genetic propagation into an economic model of dynamic management to derive cost benefit rules for optimal screening. The highly non-linear nature of genetic dynamics gives rise to perhaps surprising results that include discontinuous controls and threshold effects. One insight is that any screening program that is in place for any amount of time should screen all individuals in a target population. The incorporation of genetic models may prove to be useful to several emerging fields in economics such as genoeconomics, neuroeconomics and paleoeconomics.

Suggested Citation

  • Nævdal, Eric, 2014. "Optimal screening for genetic diseases," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 129-139.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ehbiol:v:15:y:2014:i:c:p:129-139
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ehb.2014.08.002
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Genetic dynamics; Genetic screening; Optimal control;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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