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Optimal Screening for Genetic Diseases

  • Nævdal, Eric

    ()

    (Department of Economics)

Screening for genetic diseases is performed in many regions and/or ethnic groups where there is a high prevalence of possibly malign genes. The propagation of such genes can be considered dynamic externality. Given that many of these diseases are untreatable and give rise to truly tragic outcomes they are a source for societal concern and the screening process should perhaps be regulated. The present paper incorporates a standard model of genetic propagation into an economic model of dynamic management. The paper derives cost benefit rules for optimal screening. The highly non-linear nature of genetic dynamics gives rise to perhaps surprising results which include discontinuous controls and threshold effects. One insight is that a screening program, if at all in place at all at some point in time, should screen all individuals.

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File URL: http://www.hero.uio.no/publicat/2008/2008_2.pdf
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Paper provided by Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme in its series HERO On line Working Paper Series with number 2008:2.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 02 Jun 2009
Handle: RePEc:hhs:oslohe:2008_002
Contact details of provider: Postal:
HERO / Institute of Health Management and Health Economics P.O. Box 1089 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway

Phone: 2307 5309
Fax: 2307 5310
Web page: http://www.hero.uio.no/eng.html
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  1. Emons, Winand, 2007. "Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 6047, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Francis, Peter J., 1997. "Dynamic epidemiology and the market for vaccinations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 383-406, February.
  3. Lundborg, Petter & Stenberg, Anders, 2010. "Nature, nurture and socioeconomic policy--What can we learn from molecular genetics?," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 320-330, December.
  4. Fernando Antoñanzas & R. Rodríguez-Ibeas & M. Hutter & R. Lorente & C. Juárez & M. Pinillos, 2012. "Genetic testing in the European Union: does economic evaluation matter?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 13(5), pages 651-661, October.
  5. Doherty, Neil A. & Thistle, Paul D., 1996. "Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 83-102, December.
  6. Wirl, Franz, 1991. "Economics of (oil) price politics: Penalizing price changes," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 515-527.
  7. Hoel, Michael & Iversen, Tor & Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon, 2006. "Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 847-860, September.
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