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Exam precision and learning effort

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  • Bertola, Giuseppe

Abstract

The learning effort that determines the probability of passing an imprecise exam can decrease when the exam becomes more precise, and certainly does when the failure probability reaches or approaches zero. If the distribution of the measurement errors that trigger random failure is approximately normal, effort is maximum when precision implies a failure probability of about 16%.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertola, Giuseppe, 2021. "Exam precision and learning effort," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:207:y:2021:i:c:s0165176521002974
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
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    3. Kuehn Zoë & Landeras Pedro, 2014. "The Effect of Family Background on Student Effort," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 14(4), pages 1-67, October.
    4. Gianni De Fraja & Tania Oliveira & Luisa Zanchi, 2010. "Must Try Harder: Evaluating the Role of Effort in Educational Attainment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(3), pages 577-597, August.
    5. Pedro Landeras, 2009. "Student effort: standards vs. tournaments," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(9), pages 965-969.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Principal–agent; Higher education;

    JEL classification:

    • I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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