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Religious entrenchment and agency costs

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  • Nawaz, Tasawar
  • Virk, Nader Shahzad

Abstract

The entrenchment effects of 20 prominent Shariah scholars show an increase in the agency costs for the Islamic banks in our study. This supports the notion that managers may provide concessions to external non-shareholding stakeholders to pursue their personal agendas.

Suggested Citation

  • Nawaz, Tasawar & Virk, Nader Shahzad, 2019. "Religious entrenchment and agency costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 83-86.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:83-86
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.032
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1989. "Management entrenchment : The case of manager-specific investments," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 123-139, November.
    2. Farag, Hisham & Mallin, Chris & Ow-Yong, Kean, 2018. "Corporate governance in Islamic banks: New insights for dual board structure and agency relationships," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 59-77.
    3. Mohamed Ariff & Munawar Iqbal, 2011. "Introduction to Islamic Financial Institutions," Chapters, in: Mohamed Ariff & Munawar Iqbal (ed.), The Foundations of Islamic Banking, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Safiullah, Md & Shamsuddin, Abul, 2018. "Risk in Islamic banking and corporate governance," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 129-149.
    5. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation," Scholarly Articles 29407535, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    6. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    7. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1988. "The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations : An exploratory analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 317-346, January.
    8. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    9. Mohammed Obaidullah, 2005. "The Islamic Financial Services الخدمات المالية الإسلامية," Books published by the Islamic Economics Institute, KAAU., King Abdulaziz University, Islamic Economics Institute., edition 1, number 40, July.
    10. Mollah, Sabur & Zaman, Mahbub, 2015. "Shari’ah supervision, corporate governance and performance: Conventional vs. Islamic banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 418-435.
    11. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kok, Seng Kiong & Shahgholian, Azar, 2023. "The impact of proximity within elite corporate networks on the Shariah governance-firm performance nexus: Evidence from the global Shariah elite," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    2. Tasawar Nawaz & Roszaini Haniffa & Mohammad Hudaib, 2021. "On intellectual capital efficiency and shariah governance in Islamic banking business model," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(3), pages 3770-3787, July.
    3. Kok, Seng Kiong & Giorgioni, Gianluigi & Farquhar, Stuart, 2022. "The trade-off between knowledge accumulation and independence: The case of the Shariah supervisory board within the Shariah governance and firm performance nexus," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    4. Kok, Seng Kiong & Filomeni, Stefano, 2021. "The holding behavior of Shariah financial assets within the global Islamic financial sector: A macroeconomic and firm-based model," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    5. Kok, Seng Kiong & Akwei, Cynthia & Giorgioni, Gianluigi & Farquhar, Stuart, 2022. "On the regulation of the intersection between religion and the provision of financial services: Conversations with market actors within the global Islamic financial services sector," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    6. Shahzad Virk, Nader & Nawaz, Tasawar & Molyneux, Philip, 2022. "A canary in a Coalmine! religious agency and its impact on the performance of Islamic banks," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entrenchment; Shariah scholars; Agency costs; Islamic banks; Non-shareholding stakeholders;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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