IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Lending terms and aggregate productivity

Listed author(s):
  • Figueroa, Nicolás
  • Leukhina, Oksana

Several empirical studies suggest that lending terms are eased in expansions and tightened in recessions, thereby influencing the mix of financed entrepreneurs. We study a model of adverse selection in competitive financial markets and show that lending terms deteriorate with the aggregate state under two general conditions. If exogenous increments to entrepreneurs׳ productivity raise returns to investment and/or tighten the credit line needed to screen out a given entrepreneur type, competition results in contracts with less screening. Two endogenous effects on productivity emerge. Production scales grow closer to optimal, but lower productivity entrepreneurs enter the mix of producers. The positive (negative) effect dominates at low (high) aggregate states.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188915001311
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Volume (Year): 59 (2015)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 1-21

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:59:y:2015:i:c:p:1-21
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2015.07.001
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
  2. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-248, April.
  3. Azariadis, Costas & Smith, Bruce, 1998. "Financial Intermediation and Regime Switching in Business Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 516-536, June.
  4. Berger, Allen N. & Udell, Gregory F., 2004. "The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality of bank lending behavior," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 458-495, October.
  5. Gabriel Jiménez & Jesús Saurina, 2006. "Credit Cycles, Credit Risk, and Prudential Regulation," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 2(2), May.
  6. Lucia Foster & John Haltiwanger & C.J. Krizan, 2002. "The Link Between Aggregate and Micro Productivity Growth: Evidence from Retail Trade," NBER Working Papers 9120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Suarez, Javier & Sussman, Oren, 1997. "Endogenous Cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 47-71, September.
  8. Hellwig, Martin, 1987. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 319-325.
  9. Erzo G. J. Luttmer, 2007. "Selection, Growth, and the Size Distribution of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(3), pages 1103-1144.
  10. Martin Ruckes, 2004. "Bank Competition and Credit Standards," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 17(4), pages 1073-1102.
  11. Lee, Yoonsoo & Mukoyama, Toshihiko, 2015. "Entry and exit of manufacturing plants over the business cycle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 20-27.
  12. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  13. Asea, Patrick K. & Blomberg, Brock, 1998. "Lending cycles," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1-2), pages 89-128.
  14. Raghuram G. Rajan, 1994. "Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(2), pages 399-441.
  15. Pietro Reichlin & Paolo Siconolfi, 2004. "Optimal debt contracts and moral hazard along the business cycle," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(1), pages 75-109, July.
  16. House, Christopher L., 2006. "Adverse selection and the financial accelerator," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 1117-1134, September.
  17. Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2006. "Lending Booms and Lending Standards," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(5), pages 2511-2546, October.
  18. Alberto Martin, 2004. "Endogenous credit cycles," Economics Working Papers 916, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Aug 2008.
  19. Williamson, Stephen D, 1987. "Financial Intermediation, Business Failures, and Real Business Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1196-1216, December.
  20. Bernanke, Ben & Gertler, Mark, 1989. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 14-31, March.
  21. Matthias Kehrig, 2011. "The Cyclicality of Productivity Dispersion," 2011 Meeting Papers 484, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  22. Rampini, Adriano A., 2004. "Entrepreneurial activity, risk, and the business cycle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 555-573, April.
  23. Giovanni Favara, 2012. "Agency Problems and Endogenous Investment Fluctuations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(7), pages 2301-2342.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:59:y:2015:i:c:p:1-21. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.