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Strategic exploitation of a common resource under environmental risk

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  • Fesselmeyer, Eric
  • Santugini, Marc

Abstract

We study the effect of environmental risk on the extraction of a common resource. Using a dynamic and non-cooperative game in which an environmental event impacts the renewability and the quality of the resource, we show that the anticipation of such an event has an ambiguous effect on extraction and the tragedy of the commons. A risk of a reduction in the renewability induces the agents to extract less today while a risk of a deterioration in the quality has the opposite effect. Moreover, when environmental risk induces conservation, the tragedy of the commons is worsened.

Suggested Citation

  • Fesselmeyer, Eric & Santugini, Marc, 2013. "Strategic exploitation of a common resource under environmental risk," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 125-136.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:37:y:2013:i:1:p:125-136 DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2012.06.010
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    Cited by:

    1. Adam N. Walker & Hans-Peter Weikard & Andries Richter, 2015. "The Rise and Fall of the Great Fish Pact under Endogenous Risk of Stock Collapse," Working Papers 2015.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    2. Miller, Steve & Nkuiya, Bruno, 2016. "Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 189-207.
    3. Diekert, Florian K., 2015. "Threatening Thresholds? The effect of disastrous regime shifts on the cooperative and non-cooperative use of environmental goods and services," Memorandum 12/2015, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    4. Christopher Costello & Bruno Nkuiya & Nicolas Querou, 2017. "Extracting spatial resources under possible regime shift," Working Papers 17-07, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier.
    5. Florian K. Diekert & Emmi Nieminen, 2017. "International Fisheries Agreements with a Shifting Stock," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 185-211, June.
    6. Christopher Costello & Bruno Nkuiya & Nicolas Querou, 2017. "Extracting spatial resources under possible regime shift," Working Papers hal-01615939, HAL.
    7. Agbo, Maxime, 2014. "Strategic exploitation with learning and heterogeneous beliefs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 126-140.
    8. Diekert, Florian K., 2017. "Threatening thresholds? The effect of disastrous regime shifts on the non-cooperative use of environmental goods and services," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 30-49.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conservation; Dynamic games; Environmental risk; Renewable resources; Tragedy of the commons;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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