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The dual policy in the dual economy—The political economy of urban bias in dictatorial regimes

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  • Shifa, Abdulaziz B.

Abstract

In many developing countries, public resource allocation is often biased against the rural population. Since a vast majority of the poor live in rural areas, the bias is highlighted as one of the most important institutional factors contributing to poverty. This paper develops a political economy model of urban bias in a dictatorial regime. A novel result of the model is that urban bias can emerge in predominantly agrarian economies even if there is no bias in political power toward urban residents. The empirical evidence from a recently compiled country-level panel dataset on agricultural taxes/subsidies is consistent with the prediction of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Shifa, Abdulaziz B., 2013. "The dual policy in the dual economy—The political economy of urban bias in dictatorial regimes," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 77-85.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:105:y:2013:i:c:p:77-85
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.07.005
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    Cited by:

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    3. Heba E. Helmy, 2019. "Thirty Years of Urban Bias: An Estimation of the Rising Disparities in Female Rural and Female Urban Unemployment and Income in Egypt," Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy, Centre for Agrarian Research and Education for South, vol. 8(3), pages 349-390, December.
    4. Vestby, Jonas & Buhaug, Halvard & von Uexkull, Nina, 2021. "Why do some poor countries see armed conflict while others do not? A dual sector approach," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    5. Catalina Tejada & Eliana Ferrara & Henrik Kleven & Florian Blum & Oriana Bandiera & Michel Azulai, 2015. "State Effectiveness, Growth, and Development," Working Papers id:6668, eSocialSciences.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O2 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy
    • R1 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics

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