The Effect of Discounting on Policy Choices in Inflation Targeting Regimes
This article assesses the implications of discounting on a result derived by Bean (1998): that in a model of monetary policy where policy acts with a lag, the outcomes of monetary policy are very similar for a wide range of preferences of the monetary authority with respect to inflation and output stability. We show that when the authority discounts the future, outcomes become more sensitive to its preferences, and that it is important to take the discount rate into account when examining the question of how the authority's remit should be specified. Copyright 2006 Royal Economic Society.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 116 (2006)
Issue (Month): 508 (01)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +44 1334 462479
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:116:y:2006:i:508:p:266-282. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.