IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-03f00002.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why Global Integration May Lead to Terrorism: An Evolutionary Theory of Mimetic Rivalry

Author

Listed:
  • Thierry Vignolo

    (LA.M.E.T.A)

  • Agnès d'Artigues

    (C.R.E.D.E.N)

Abstract

We study the emergence of the recent form of terrorism using evolutionary game theory. The model is an economic interpretation of René Girard's theory of mimetic rivalry. This theory presents terrorism as the result of competition between countries, when the desire to imitate the leading country is frustrated by the impossibility of doing so. We define a multi-country setup where interaction takes place in an international trade game, which is a coordination game. Countries follow a simple behavioral rule trying to reduce the gap between the maximal payoff obtained and their own payoff. In a coordination game, this may lead to mimetic rivalry behavior, that is the deliberate choice of a strategy degrading the situation of the leading country. Paradoxically, we find that the desire of convergence may lead to a more partitioned world economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Vignolo & Agnès d'Artigues, 2003. "Why Global Integration May Lead to Terrorism: An Evolutionary Theory of Mimetic Rivalry," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(11), pages 1-8.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-03f00002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2003/Volume6/EB-03F00002A.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, April.
    2. Wolfgang Keller, 2002. "Geographic Localization of International Technology Diffusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 120-142, March.
    3. David H. Bearce & Eric O'N. Fisher, 2002. "Economic Geography, Trade, and War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(3), pages 365-393, June.
    4. Wolfgang Keller, 2004. "International Technology Diffusion," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(3), pages 752-782, September.
    5. Goodfriend, Marvin & McDermott, John, 1998. "Industrial Development and the Convergence Question," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1277-1289, December.
    6. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    7. David Canning, 1989. "Convergence to Equilibrium in a Sequence for Games with Learning," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 190, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    8. Dennis E. Smallwood & John Conlisk, 1979. "Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers are Imperfectly Informed," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(1), pages 1-23.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bakker, Craig & Webster, Jennifer B. & Nowak, Kathleen E. & Chatterjee, Samrat & Perkins, Casey J. & Brigantic, Robert, 2020. "Multi-Game Modeling for Counter-Smuggling," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dawid, Herbert, 1997. "Learning of equilibria by a population with minimal information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 1-18, January.
    2. Matsui Akihiko & Matsuyama Kiminori, 1995. "An Approach to Equilibrium Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 415-434, April.
    3. Jakob Brochner Madsen, 2016. "Human Accomplishment and Growth in Britain since 1270: The Role of Great Scientists and Education," Monash Economics Working Papers 01-16, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    4. Giannetti, Mariassunta, 2002. "The effects of integration on regional disparities: Convergence, divergence or both?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 539-567, March.
    5. Schulte, Patrick, 2015. "Does skill-biased technical change diffuse internationally?," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-088, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    6. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2007. "Technology, Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1759-1799.
    7. Maarten C.W. Janssen, 1997. "Focal Points," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-091/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Michael Kosfeld, 2002. "Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(2), pages 321-339.
    9. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0113, Econometric Society.
    10. Dietmar Harhoff & Elisabeth Mueller & John Van Reenen, 2014. "What are the Channels for Technology Sourcing? Panel Data Evidence from German Companies," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(1), pages 204-224, March.
    11. Bretschger, Lucas & Lechthaler, Filippo & Rausch, Sebastian & Zhang, Lin, 2017. "Knowledge diffusion, endogenous growth, and the costs of global climate policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 47-72.
    12. Thomas Bolli & Martin Woerter, 2013. "Technological Diversification and Innovation Performance," KOF Working papers 13-336, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    13. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2005. "Government policy and the probability of coordination failures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 939-973, May.
    14. Hyuk-Soo Kwon & Jihong Lee & Sokbae Lee & Ryungha Oh, 2022. "Knowledge spillovers and patent citations: trends in geographic localization, 1976–2015," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(3), pages 123-147, April.
    15. Grace Li Ann Yong & Kong Weng Ho, 2006. "Innovation, Imitation And Entrepreneurship," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 51(02), pages 147-173.
    16. James B. Ang & Jakob B. Madsen, 2012. "Risk capital, private credit, and innovative production," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(4), pages 1608-1639, November.
    17. Jun Honda, 2015. "Games with the Total Bandwagon Property," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp197, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    18. Miketa, Asami & Mulder, Peter, 2005. "Energy productivity across developed and developing countries in 10 manufacturing sectors: Patterns of growth and convergence," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 429-453, May.
    19. , & , & ,, 2008. "Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), June.
    20. Lucas Bretschger, 2003. "Growth in a Globalised Economy: The Effects of Capital Taxes and Tax Competition," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 03/24, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Terrorism Evolutionary game theory Mimetic Rivalry Risk-dominance;

    JEL classification:

    • F0 - International Economics - - General
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-03f00002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.