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Ciclo de recursos naturales y política fiscal bajo preferencias inconsistentes

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  • Sergio Peláez

Abstract

En este estudio se identifica un problema económico y uno político a los que se enfrentan los países exportadores de recursos naturales. El primero es una externalidad negativa sobre la estructura productiva generada por un producto básico de exportación; el segundo es la presencia de preferencias inconsistentes, que explican por qué los gobernantes prefieren gastar los recursos de la bonanza en lugar de ahorrarlos. Se analizan estos fallos para Colombia como consecuencia del ciclo petrolero (2000-2018). Primero, se prueban las vulnerabilidades. Con metodologías VAR-VECM se demuestra la existencia de efecto cambiario y efecto absorción (en inversión y no en consumo), mientras se descarta la presencia de un efecto factorial y cambio estructural. Al analizar los mecanismos de ahorro fiscal implementados para la bonanza se concluye que su inoperancia se debe a la permisividad de invertir en bonos del gobierno nacional; falta de vigilancia y comunicación; bajo nivel de ahorro y ausencia (o descoordinación) de una regla fiscal. A partir de lecciones internacionales y de los nuevos mecanismos de ahorro del sistema general de regalías se recomienda: 1) conformar el portafolio de inversiones con activos en el exterior; 2) incorporar vigilancia externa, publica y mediática; y 3) coordinar la regla fiscal con el fondo.

Suggested Citation

  • Sergio Peláez, 2018. "Ciclo de recursos naturales y política fiscal bajo preferencias inconsistentes," Coyuntura Económica, Fedesarrollo, vol. 48(1-2), pages 13-78, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000438:017620
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Externalidades; Elección Intertemporal; Hidrocarburos; Política Fiscal; Fluctuaciones; Ciclos Económicos;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • L71 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles

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