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Monetary Policy, Privileges and Economic Development: Ordoliberal Lessons for the EMU

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  • Duarte Pablo

    (UniversitätLeipzig , Institut für empirische Wirtschaftsforschung, Germany)

Abstract

Die Währungs- und Wirtschaftsreform der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahre 1948 schuf institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen, die eine schnelle Erholung nach dem Krieg ermöglichten. Die Reformen basierten auf der Idee einer privilegienfreien Wettbewerbsordnung als Mittel für eine funktionierende und für die Teilnehmer zustimmungsfähige Wirtschaftsordnung. Die Krisenbewältigungspolitik in der EWU nach 2009 geht in die entgegengesetzte Richtung. Ausgehend von technokratischen Argumenten, haben die europäischen Institutionen Privilegien in Form von Rettungsmaßnahmen gewährt. Indirekt hat die EZB durch die sehr lockere Geldpolitik weitere Privilegien gewährt. Die erwarteten Folgen sind weniger Wettbewerb, eine höhere Konzentration der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Macht, die „Zombifizierung“ von Unternehmen und Banken sowie ein geringeres Produktivitäts- und Produktionswachstum. Die Lehre aus den Reformen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die EWU ist die Relevanz einer privilegienfreien Wettbewerbsordnung für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung.

Suggested Citation

  • Duarte Pablo, 2018. "Monetary Policy, Privileges and Economic Development: Ordoliberal Lessons for the EMU," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 69(1), pages 135-152, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:69:y:2018:i:1:p:135-152:n:9
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2019-0010
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    2. Schnabl Gunther, 2020. "Soziale Marktwirtschaft damals und heute," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 69(1), pages 1-24, May.

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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