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Aestheticism in The Theory of Custom

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  • Schlicht Ekkehart

Abstract

La nature des processus d'apprentissage ainsi que les considérations évolutionaires suggèrent que le jugement esthétique est d'une importance centrale dans la formation des coutumes. L' apprentissage et l'extrapolation prennent appui sur les évaluations de caractéristiques noninstrumentales telles que la simplicité, l'analogie, la droiture et la clarté. De plus, l'apprentissage est particulièrement efficace s'il est animé par un désir actif de découvrir de nouvelles régularités, plutôt que de rassembler simplement des informations de manière passive.A partir d'une perspective évolutionaire, l'apprentissage a évolué par adaptation aux changements rapides et environnementaux qui ne peuvent être efficacement traduits par les processus évolutifs lents et de long terme qui se situent au niveau génétique. La "raison d'être" évolutionaire de l'apprentissage est de permettre aux individus de chercher sans cesse à découvrir de nouvelles régularités et d'agir sur elles de manière appropriée. De même que l'apprentissage dépend des jugements esthétiques, la sélection évolutionaire pour l'apprentissage implique une matrice évolutionaire du sens esthétique, et une préférence pour des modèles et des actions stéréotypées qui en fin de compte conduisent à la formation de coutumes et d'une compréhension sociale. L'article est, ainsi, une présentation évolutionaire étayée des tendances "behaviorales" sous-tendant ma théorie des coutumes.The nature of learning processes as well as evolutionary considerations suggest that aesthetic judgement is of central importance in the formation of custom. Learning and extrapolation rely on evaluations of non-instrumental features like simplicity, analogy, straightforwardness, and clarity. Further, learning is particularly effective if it is driven by an active desire to uncover new regularities, rather than merely gathering information in a passive way.From an evolutionary perspective, learning has evolved as an adaptation to fa
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • Schlicht Ekkehart, 2000. "Aestheticism in The Theory of Custom," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 33-52, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:jeehcn:v:10:y:2000:i:1:p:20:n:2
    DOI: 10.1515/jeeh-2000-0102
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schlicht, Ekkehart & Kubon-Gilke, Gisela, 1993. "Gefordertheit und institutionelle Analyse am Beispiel des Eigentums," Munich Reprints in Economics 3173, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    2. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Evolution, learning, and economic behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-24, February.
    3. Reinhard Pirker & Hermann Rauchenschwandtner, 1998. "Sense of Community: A Fundamental Concept of Institutional Economics," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 154(2), pages 406-406, June.
    4. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1998. "On Custom in the Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292241, Decembrie.
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    Cited by:

    1. Uta-Maria Niederle, 2005. "From Possession to Property: Preferences and the Role of Culture," Chapters, in: John Finch & Magali Orillard (ed.), Complexity and the Economy, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 2001. "Gestalt Justice. The Fusion of Emotion and Cognition in the Gestalt View of Justice," Munich Reprints in Economics 76329, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1992. "On Custom," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 37769, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
    4. Loasby, Brian J., 2002. "The evolution of knowledge: beyond the biological model," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(8-9), pages 1227-1239, December.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B15 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • E14 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Austrian; Evolutionary; Institutional

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