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The Effect of Interlocking Director Network on Corporate Risk Taking: Lessons from China

Author

Listed:
  • Su Kun

    () (School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, China)

  • Liu Heng

    () (Sun Yat-sen University Lingnan College, Guangzhou510275, China)

Abstract

Using a dataset of Chinese listed companies, this article quantizes the centrality of interlocking director network based on the social network analysis and examines the effect of interlocking director network on corporate risk taking. The empirical results find that when interlocking director networks have a high centrality, network members are more likely to imitate risk-taking behaviors. Marketization and investment opportunities have positive moderating effects, indicating boundary conditions in social network theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Su Kun & Liu Heng, 2019. "The Effect of Interlocking Director Network on Corporate Risk Taking: Lessons from China," Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-21, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:erjour:v:9:y:2019:i:1:p:21:n:4
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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