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The Japanese corporate board network

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  • Raddant, Matthias
  • Takahashi, Hiroshi

Abstract

We analyze the dynamics of the Japanese board network from 2004 until 2013. We find that the network exhibits some clustering with visible firm conglomerates. Ties between firms are rather persistent, despite noticeable churning among directors. Ownership relations explain only a small fraction of board links. Besides densely connected conglomerates, some tendency of within-sector linkages and linkages to financial institutions can be confirmed. We further investigate the increase in the number of outside directors and find that sectoral differences as well as shareholder characteristics explain to large extend the variation in board composition. The connectivity of firms in the ownership and board network is sometimes related to firm profitability. Firms that are linked to peers with above average profitability are likely also more profitable than firms in other ownership relationships.

Suggested Citation

  • Raddant, Matthias & Takahashi, Hiroshi, 2019. "The Japanese corporate board network," Kiel Working Papers 2130, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:2130
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate board interlock; corporate governance; board composition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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