IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v66y2020i8p3361-3388.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do Director Networks Matter for Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence from Audit Committee Connectedness and Restatements

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas C. Omer

    (School of Accountancy, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588)

  • shelley@unl.edu

    (School of Accountancy, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588)

  • Frances M. Tice

    (Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado Boulder, Boulder, Colorado 80309)

Abstract

This study examines the effect of audit committee connectedness through director networks on financial reporting quality, specifically the misstatement of annual financial statements. Using network analysis, we examine multiple dimensions of connectedness and find that after controlling for operating performance and corporate governance characteristics, firms with well-connected audit committees are less likely to misstate annual financial statements. In addition, our study demonstrates that audit committee connectedness through director networks moderates the negative effect of board interlocks to misstating firms on financial reporting quality. We conduct several tests to address identification concerns and find similar results. Our findings suggest that firms with better-connected audit committees are less likely to adopt reporting practices that reduce financial reporting quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas C. Omer & shelley@unl.edu & Frances M. Tice, 2020. "Do Director Networks Matter for Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence from Audit Committee Connectedness and Restatements," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(8), pages 3361-3388, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:66:y:2020:i:8:p:3361-3388
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3331
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3331
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3331?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Larcker, David F. & So, Eric C. & Wang, Charles C.Y., 2013. "Boardroom centrality and firm performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 225-250.
    2. Lauren Cohen & Andrea Frazzini & Christopher Malloy, 2010. "Sell‐Side School Ties," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(4), pages 1409-1437, August.
    3. Brant E. Christensen & Steven M. Glover & Thomas C. Omer & Marjorie K. Shelley, 2016. "Understanding Audit Quality: Insights from Audit Professionals and Investors," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(4), pages 1648-1684, December.
    4. Klein, April, 2002. "Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 375-400, August.
    5. Deborah S. Archambeault & F. Todd Dezoort & Dana R. Hermanson, 2008. "Audit Committee Incentive Compensation and Accounting Restatements," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 25(4), pages 965-992, December.
    6. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    7. Lauren Cohen & Andrea Frazzini & Christopher Malloy, 2008. "The Small World of Investing: Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(5), pages 951-979, October.
    8. Xie, Biao & Davidson, Wallace III & DaDalt, Peter J., 2003. "Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 295-316, June.
    9. Bruce Johnson, W. & Magee, Robert P. & Nagarajan, Nandu J. & Newman, Harry A., 1985. "An analysis of the stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths : Implications for the managerial labor market," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 151-174, April.
    10. Palmrose, Zoe-Vonna & Richardson, Vernon J. & Scholz, Susan, 2004. "Determinants of market reactions to restatement announcements," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 59-89, February.
    11. A. Colin Cameron & Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, 2011. "Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 238-249, April.
    12. Joseph F. Brazel & Keith L. Jones & Mark F. Zimbelman, 2009. "Using Nonfinancial Measures to Assess Fraud Risk," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(5), pages 1135-1166, December.
    13. Sah, Raaj K, 1991. "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-1295, December.
    14. Hayes, Rachel M. & Schaefer, Scott, 1999. "How much are differences in managerial ability worth?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 125-148, April.
    15. Berger, Philip G & Ofek, Eli & Yermack, David L, 1997. "Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(4), pages 1411-1438, September.
    16. Suraj Srinivasan, 2005. "Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 291-334, May.
    17. Sarah C. Rice & David P. Weber, 2012. "How Effective Is Internal Control Reporting under SOX 404? Determinants of the (Non‐)Disclosure of Existing Material Weaknesses," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 811-843, June.
    18. Nguyen, Bang Dang & Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, 2010. "The value of independent directors: Evidence from sudden deaths," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 550-567, December.
    19. John Bizjak & Michael Lemmon & Ryan Whitby, 2009. "Option Backdating and Board Interlocks," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(11), pages 4821-4847, November.
    20. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, 2006. "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 689-724, April.
    21. Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, 2002. "Large–Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 1091-1123, September.
    22. DeFond, Mark L. & Jiambalvo, James, 1994. "Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 145-176, January.
    23. Engelberg, Joseph & Gao, Pengjie & Parsons, Christopher A., 2012. "Friends with money," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 169-188.
    24. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
    25. Baber, William R. & Janakiraman, Surya N. & Kang, Sok-Hyon, 1996. "Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 297-318, June.
    26. Sweeney, Amy Patricia, 1994. "Debt-covenant violations and managers' accounting responses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 281-308, May.
    27. Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 1997. "Industry costs of equity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 153-193, February.
    28. Martin J. Conyon & Mark R. Muldoon, 2006. "The Small World of Corporate Boards," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(9‐10), pages 1321-1343, November.
    29. Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
    30. Bell, Tb & Tabor, Rh, 1991. "Empirical-Analysis Of Audit Uncertainty Qualifications," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 350-370.
    31. Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Jarrell, Gregg, 1997. "Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-220, June.
    32. Kinney, William Jr. & McDaniel, Linda S., 1989. "Characteristics of firms correcting previously reported quarterly earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 71-93, February.
    33. Martin J. Conyon & Mark R. Muldoon, 2006. "The Small World of Corporate Boards," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(9-10), pages 1321-1343.
    34. Dechow, Patricia & Ge, Weili & Schrand, Catherine, 2010. "Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 344-401, December.
    35. Ertimur, Yonca & Ferri, Fabrizio & Maber, David A., 2012. "Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 118-144.
    36. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
    37. Edward C. Norton & Hua Wang & Chunrong Ai, 2004. "Computing interaction effects and standard errors in logit and probit models," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 4(2), pages 154-167, June.
    38. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    39. Intintoli, Vincent J. & Kahle, Kathleen M. & Zhao, Wanli, 2018. "Director Connectedness: Monitoring Efficacy and Career Prospects," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 65-108, February.
    40. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    41. Adams, Renée B. & Ferreira, Daniel, 2008. "Do directors perform for pay?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 154-171, September.
    42. Feroz, Eh & Park, K & Pastena, Vs, 1991. "The Financial And Market Effects Of The Secs Accounting And Auditing Enforcement Releases," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29, pages 107-142.
    43. Brochet, Francois & Srinivasan, Suraj, 2014. "Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 430-449.
    44. A. Colin Cameron & Douglas L. Miller, 2015. "A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 50(2), pages 317-372.
    45. Stephen P. Borgatti & Daniel S. Halgin, 2011. "On Network Theory," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 22(5), pages 1168-1181, October.
    46. Merle Erickson & Michelle Hanlon & Edward L. Maydew, 2006. "Is There a Link between Executive Equity Incentives and Accounting Fraud?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 113-143, March.
    47. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1988. "The Determinants of Board Composition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 589-606, Winter.
    48. Masulis, Ronald W. & Mobbs, Shawn, 2014. "Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 406-429.
    49. Johnson, Marilyn F. & Nelson, Karen K. & Frankel, Richard M., 2002. "The Relation Between Auditor's Fees for Non-audit Services and Earnings Quality," Research Papers 1696r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    50. William R. Kinney & Zoe‐Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, 2004. "Auditor Independence, Non‐Audit Services, and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 561-588, June.
    51. Berry, Tammy K. & Bizjak, John M. & Lemmon, Michael L. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Organizational complexity and CEO labor markets: Evidence from diversified firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 797-817, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Velte, 2023. "The link between corporate governance and corporate financial misconduct. A review of archival studies and implications for future research," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 353-411, February.
    2. Lai Van Vo & Huong Thi Thu Le & Youngbin Kim, 2023. "Board interlocks, career prospects and corporate social responsibility," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(4), pages 4565-4595, December.
    3. Krishnamurti, Chandrasekhar & Chowdhury, Hasibul & Han, Hien Duc, 2021. "CEO centrality and stock price crash risk," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C).
    4. Jian Zhou & Xiaodong Lei & Jianglong Yu, 2024. "ESG rating divergence and corporate green innovation," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(4), pages 2911-2930, May.
    5. Bai, Jing & Tang, Xuesong & Zheng, Yuxin, 2023. "Serving the truth: Do directors with media background improve financial reporting quality?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    6. Suman Lodh & Monomita Nandy & Jaskaran Kaur, 2023. "Influence of governance bundles and directors' social capital on cash holding in foreign cross‐listed firms," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 4271-4298, October.
    7. Puławska Karolina & Dobija Dorota & Piotrowska Katarzyna & Kravchenko Grygorii, 2021. "Audit Committee Formation: The Case of Poland," Journal of Management and Business Administration. Central Europe, Sciendo, vol. 29(2), pages 169-212, June.
    8. Bénédicte Brullebaut & Isabelle Allemand & Enrico Prinz & Florence Thépot, 2022. "Persistence in corporate networks through boards of directors? A longitudinal study of interlocks in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 16(6), pages 1743-1782, August.
    9. Alexeyeva, Irina, 2024. "Does board composition impact the timeliness of financial reporting? Evidence from Swedish privately held companies," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    10. Hansin Bilgili & Jonathan L. Johnson & Tsvetomira V. Bilgili & Alan E. Ellstrand, 2022. "Research on social relationships and processes governing the behaviors of members of the corporate elite: a review and bibliometric analysis," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 16(8), pages 2285-2339, November.
    11. Hou, Chenxue & Wang, Qijian, 2023. "CSRC oral communication and corporate disclosure," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    12. Sun, Li & Johnson, Grace & Bradley, Wray, 2022. "CEO power and annual report reading difficulty," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2).
    13. Li, Wentao & Li, Xue & Peng, Lanying & Yao, Zhenye, 2024. "Impact of interlocking directors with digital experience on corporate digitalization: Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(PA).
    14. Olayinka Oyekola & Olapeju C. Ogunmokun & Martha A. Omolo & Samuel Odewunmi, 2023. "Gender, Legal Origin, and Accounting Disclosure: Evidence from More Than 140,000 Firms," Discussion Papers 2313, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    15. Lindsay Baran & Silu Cheng, 2024. "Director awards and board effectiveness," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 64(1), pages 41-73, March.
    16. Jing He, 2022. "Executive Network Centrality and Corporate Reporting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1512-1536, February.
    17. Farah, Nusrat & Islam, Md Shariful & Tadesse, Amanuel & McCumber, William, 2024. "Impact of audit committee social capital on the adoption of COSO 2013," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kathy Fogel & Liping Ma & Randall Morck, 2021. "Powerful independent directors," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(4), pages 935-983, December.
    2. Li, Siyuan & Qu, Tianshu Charlotte & Yu, Yingri Julia, 2022. "Outside director social network centrality and turnover before stock performance crash: A friend in need?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    3. Yanmin Gao & Jeong-Bon Kim & Desmond Tsang & Haibin Wu, 2017. "Go before the whistle blows: an empirical analysis of director turnover and financial fraud," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 320-360, March.
    4. Ching-Hung Chang & Qingqing Wu, 2021. "Board Networks and Corporate Innovation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3618-3654, June.
    5. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    6. Lin, Zhijun & Song, Byron Y. & Tian, Zhimin, 2016. "Does director-level reputation matter? Evidence from bank loan contracting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 160-176.
    7. Kuang, Yu Flora & Lee, Gladys, 2017. "Corporate fraud and external social connectedness of independent directors," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 401-427.
    8. Zhang, Shuran, 2021. "Directors’ career concerns: Evidence from proxy contests and board interlocks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(3), pages 894-915.
    9. Lerong He & Rong Yang, 2014. "Does Industry Regulation Matter? New Evidence on Audit Committees and Earnings Management," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 123(4), pages 573-589, September.
    10. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Guay, Wayne R. & Weber, Joseph P., 2010. "The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 179-234, December.
    11. Qinlin Zhong & Yuanyuan Liu & Chun Yuan, 2017. "Director interlocks and spillover effects of board monitoring: evidence from regulatory sanctions," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 57(5), pages 1605-1633, December.
    12. Sun, Liang, 2021. "Does the location of directors' additional positions matter? A new dimension of board structure," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    13. Le, Quyen & Vafaei, Alireza & Ahmed, Kamran & Kutubi, Shawgat, 2022. "Independent directors' reputation incentives and firm performance – an Australian perspective," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    14. Khondkar E. Karim & Jiayan Li & Karen Jingrong Lin & Ashok Robin, 2022. "Do directors have style? Board interlock and accounting properties," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1-2), pages 3-32, January.
    15. Dechow, Patricia & Ge, Weili & Schrand, Catherine, 2010. "Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 344-401, December.
    16. Eunice S. Khoo & Youngdeok Lim & Gary S. Monroe, 2020. "Audit Committee Members’ Reputation Incentives and Their Effectiveness in Monitoring the Financial Reporting Process," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 56(3), pages 348-406, September.
    17. Vafeas, Nikos & Vlittis, Adamos, 2019. "Board executive committees, board decisions, and firm value," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 43-63.
    18. Volonté, Christophe, 2015. "Boards: Independent and committed directors?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 25-37.
    19. Dan Amiram & Zahn Bozanic & James D. Cox & Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff & Richard Sloan, 2018. "Financial reporting fraud and other forms of misconduct: a multidisciplinary review of the literature," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 732-783, June.
    20. Naeem Tabassum & Satwinder Singh, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-48527-6, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:66:y:2020:i:8:p:3361-3388. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.