Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1433
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- Joalland, Olivier & Pereau, Jean-Christophe & Rambonilaza, Tina, 2019.
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- Olivier Joalland & Jean-Christophe Pereau & T. Rambonilaza, 2019. "Bargaining local compensation payments for the installation of new power transmission lines," Post-Print hal-02485122, HAL.
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Keywords
bargaining; surplus division; dominant firm;All these keywords.
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