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Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation

Author

Listed:
  • Daughety, A.
  • Reinganum, J.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991. "Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation," Working Papers 91-23, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:91-23
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    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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    Cited by:

    1. Christopher C. Klein, 2007. "Anticompetitive Litigation and Antitrust Liability," Working Papers 200713, Middle Tennessee State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
    2. L. A. Franzoni, 1995. "Prosecutorial Discretion and Criminal Deterrence," Working Papers 234, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    3. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1995. "Keeping Society in the Dark: On the Admissibility of Pretrial Negotiations as Evidence in Court," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 203-221, Summer.
    4. Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, 1996. "The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution," Working Papers 743, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    5. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:11:y:2007:i:1:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Andrew F. Daughety & Reinganum F. Reinganum, 2014. "Settlement and Trial: Selected Analyses of the Bargaining Environment," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 14-00005, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    7. MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    8. Farmer, Amy & Pecorino, Paul, 2017. "Litigation with judgment proof defendants," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-9.
    9. Yang, Bill Z., 1996. "Litigation, experimentation, and reputation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 491-502, December.
    10. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2013. "Discovery and Disclosure with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Expenditure at Trial," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 223-247.
    11. Daughety, Andrew F. & Reinganum, Jennifer F., 1994. "Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 283-298, September.
    12. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2005. "Civil Litigation with Mandatory Discovery and Voluntary Transmission of Private Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 137-159, January.
    13. Finkle Aaron & Shin Dongsoo, 2010. "Disregarding the Attorney's Advice: An Agency Perspective," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 197-217, September.
    14. Miceli, Thomas J., 1999. "Settlement delay as a sorting device," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 265-274, June.
    15. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2007. "Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 595-628, September.
    16. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Litigation and the Legal Process," NBER Working Papers 9697, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Clark Derek J & Pereau Jean-Christophe, 2008. "Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-18, December.
    18. Schwab, Christian & Tang, Hin-Yue Benny, 2011. "Die Steuerungswirkungen unterschiedlicher Prozesskostenregelungen: Ein √úberblick zum Stand von Theorie und Empirie
      [The economic effects of alternative fee shifting rules: A review of the theoretic
      ," MPRA Paper 32746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Kima, Jeong-Yoo & Ryu, Keunkwan, 2000. "Pretrial negotiation behind open doors versus closed doors:: Economic analysis of Rule 408," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 285-294, June.
    20. Marco, Alan C. & Walsh, Kieran J., 2006. "Bargaining in the shadow of precedent: the surprising irrelevance of asymmetric stakes," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 81, Vassar College Department of Economics.
    21. repec:kap:ejlwec:v:45:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s10657-018-9578-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Warren F. Schwartz & Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2009. "Credible discovery, settlement, and negative expected value suits," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(4), pages 636-657.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic equilibrium ; settlement pattern;

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