Bank Regulatory Agreements and Real Estate Lending
Recent studies have found that banks with low capital ratios have significantly decreased their lending to the real estate sector. This correlation between real estate lending and bank capital could be the result of voluntary decisions by banks to recapitalize, or it could be the result of direct actions taken by bank regulators. We find that banks with low capital ratios reduce their real estate lending substantially more after formal regulatory actions have been initiated by regulators. Furthermore, this reduction in lending is particularly large for the categories of real estate borrowers most likely to be bank dependent. Copyright American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association.
Volume (Year): 24 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"The Capital Crunch: Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be,"
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