Fiskalischer Wettbewerb und Einkommensumverteilung
Fiscal competition is supposed to lead to the collapse of the welfare state because, first, it will become difficult for a single jurisdiction to levy a redistribution tax upon the rich and mobile, and second, such a policy, if undertaken in one jurisdiction, will attract poor individuals from other jurisdictions and erode the internal redistribution policy. In this paper, theoretical and empirical studies concerning the impact of taxes and transfer payments on residence decisions of taxpayers are reviewed. The relationship of fiscal competition and the erosion of the welfare state is illustrated with aggregate data on income redistribution in Switzerland. Copyright Verein fü Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000
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Volume (Year): 1 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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