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Work Absence - A Signalling Factor for Temporary Workers?

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  • Anna Amilon
  • Mårten Wallette

Abstract

This paper investigates whether low levels of absence increase the probability of permanent employment and reduce that of unemployment for Swedish temporary workers. We investigate two reasons for absence: worker sickness and sickness of a dependent child. Using a competing risk estimation model, we find that sick leave reduces the probability of permanent employment for women and increases the probability of unemployment for men. Absence due to child sickness increases the risk of unemployment for women. Although the influence of sick leave varies substantially among different temporary jobs, replacement and probation workers are generally the most affected. Copyright 2009 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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  • Anna Amilon & Mårten Wallette, 2009. "Work Absence - A Signalling Factor for Temporary Workers?," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 23(1), pages 171-194, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:labour:v:23:y:2009:i:1:p:171-194
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Ahammer, 2016. "How Physicians Affect Patients’ Employment Outcomes Through Deciding on Sick Leave Durations," CDL Aging, Health, Labor working papers 2016-04, The Christian Doppler (CD) Laboratory Aging, Health, and the Labor Market, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    2. Markussen, Simen & Røed, Knut & Røgeberg, Ole J. & Gaure, Simen, 2011. "The anatomy of absenteeism," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 277-292, March.
    3. Garrouste, Christelle & Kozovska, Kornelia & Arjona Perez, Elena, 2010. "Education and Long-Term Unemployment," MPRA Paper 25073, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Daniel Arnold, 2016. "Determinants of the Annual Duration of Sickness Presenteeism: Empirical Evidence from European Data," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 30(2), pages 198-212, June.

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