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Absence of Absenteeism and Overtime work – Signaling Factors for Temporary Workers?

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Abstract

According to theories of screening and signaling, a temporary worker who shows effort should increase the probability of obtaining a permanent contract. We use two types of signals of effort: overtime and low levels of absenteeism to investigate i) whether temporary workers show more effort and ii) whether effort has a positive effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. We find that temporary workers have lower levels of absenteeism than permanent ones, but also lower levels of overtime work. Effort has little effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. However, using a competing risks model we find that working overtime decreases the probability of becoming unemployed.

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  • Meyer, Anna & Wallette, Mårten, 2005. "Absence of Absenteeism and Overtime work – Signaling Factors for Temporary Workers?," Working Papers 2005:15, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2005_015
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    1. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 283-300, June.
    2. Ichino, Andrea & Riphahn, Regina T., 2001. "The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation," IZA Discussion Papers 385, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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    7. Arrow, Kenneth J., 1973. "Higher education as a filter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 193-216, July.
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    1. Alexis Ioannides & Eleni Oxouzi & Stavros Mavroudeas, 2014. "All work and no … pay? Unpaid overtime in Greece: determining factors and theoretical explanations," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 39-55, January.
    2. Anger, Silke, 2008. "Overtime Work as a Signaling Device," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 55(2), pages 167-189.
    3. Natalia Montinari, 2010. "Reciprocity in Teams: a Behavioral Explanation for Unpaid Overtime," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0114, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    4. Natalia Montinari, 2011. "The Dark Side of Reciprocity," Jena Economics Research Papers 2011-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.

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    JEL classification:

    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
    • J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General
    • J69 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Other

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