IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Reciprocity in Teams: a Behavioral Explanation for Unpaid Overtime

Listed author(s):
  • Natalia Montinari

    ()

    (University of Padua)

Relying on the relevance of other-regarding preferences in workplaces, the paper provides a behavioral explanation for the puzzle of unpaid overtime. It characterizes the optimal compensation schemes offered by the employer which induce overtime by exploiting workers’ horizontal reciprocity under both symmetric and asymmetric information about workers' action. Finally, the paper shows that reciprocity furnishes a rationale for the composition of teams of reciprocal workers when the production technology induces negative externality among the employees’ efforts.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://economia.unipd.it/sites/decon.unipd.it/files/20100114.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno" in its series "Marco Fanno" Working Papers with number 0114.

as
in new window

Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2010
Handle: RePEc:pad:wpaper:0114
Contact details of provider: Postal:
via del Santo, 33 - 35122 Padova

Phone: +39 +49 8274210
Fax: +39 +49 827.4211
Web page: http://www.decon.unipd.it/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window

  1. Gächter, Simon & Nosenzo, Daniele & Sefton, Martin, 2008. "The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 3639, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  2. Abigail Barr & Pieter Serneels, 2009. "Reciprocity in the workplace," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(1), pages 99-112, March.
  3. Dur, Robert & Sol, Joeri, 2009. "Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 4532, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Jean Tirole & Roland Bénabou, 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1652-1678, December.
  5. Silke Anger, 2008. "Overtime Work As A Signaling Device," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(2), pages 167-189, 05.
  6. Rotemberg, Julio J., 2006. "Altruism, reciprocity and cooperation in the workplace," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier.
  7. George A. Akerlof, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-569.
  8. Potters, J.J.M. & Suetens, S., 2006. "Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes," Discussion Paper 2006-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  10. James C. Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2006. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2006-05, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  11. Meyer, Anna & Wallette, Mårten, 2005. "Absence of Absenteeism and Overtime work – Signaling Factors for Temporary Workers?," Working Papers 2005:15, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  12. Corneo, Giacomo & Rob, Rafael, 2001. "Working in Public and Private Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 2719, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "A fine is a price," Natural Field Experiments 00258, The Field Experiments Website.
  14. Booth, Alison L. & Francesconi, Marco & Frank, Jeff, 2003. "A sticky floors model of promotion, pay, and gender," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 295-322, April.
  15. Pedro Rey-Biel, "undated". "Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives," Working Papers 319, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  16. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2009. "What norms trigger punishment?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(3), pages 272-288, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pad:wpaper:0114. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Raffaele Dei Campielisi)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.