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Reciprocity in Teams: a Behavioral Explanation for Unpaid Overtime

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  • Natalia Montinari

    (University of Padua)

Abstract

Relying on the relevance of other-regarding preferences in workplaces, the paper provides a behavioral explanation for the puzzle of unpaid overtime. It characterizes the optimal compensation schemes offered by the employer which induce overtime by exploiting workers’ horizontal reciprocity under both symmetric and asymmetric information about workers' action. Finally, the paper shows that reciprocity furnishes a rationale for the composition of teams of reciprocal workers when the production technology induces negative externality among the employees’ efforts.

Suggested Citation

  • Natalia Montinari, 2010. "Reciprocity in Teams: a Behavioral Explanation for Unpaid Overtime," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0114, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    • Handle: RePEc:pad:wpaper:0114
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Overtime; Horizontal Reciprocity; Negative Reciprocity.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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