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Reciprocity and voting

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  • Hahn, Volker

Abstract

In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the policies they pursue. We assume that voters display reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may ensure that a position closer to the median voter's position is adopted even if political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages.

Suggested Citation

  • Hahn, Volker, 2009. "Reciprocity and voting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 467-480, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:467-480
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Volker Hahn, 2007. "Fairness and voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 607-607, June.
    2. Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016. "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 557-603.
    3. Conconi, Paola & DeRemer, David R. & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Trimarchi, Lorenzo & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2017. "Suspiciously timed trade disputes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 57-76.
    4. Hahn, Volker & Mühe, Felix, 2009. "Committees and reciprocity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 26-47, January.
    5. Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2008. "Reelection threshold contracts in politics," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 233-255, August.
    6. Gersbach, Hans & Müller, Markus, 2006. "Elections, Contracts and Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 5717, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Hans Gersbach & Markus Müller, 2011. "Information Markets, Elections and Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3327, CESifo Group Munich.

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