Value Congruence as a Source of Intrinsic Motivation
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.2010.00462.x
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- Marco A. Barrenechea-Mendez & Avner Ben-Ner, 2017. "Mission Congruence and Organization Design: An Empirical Analysis of Childcare Facilities," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(3), pages 411-426, July.
- Hyung-Woo Lee & Dong-Young Rhee, 2023. "Effects of Organizational Justice on Employee Satisfaction: Integrating the Exchange and the Value-Based Perspectives," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(7), pages 1-15, March.
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