IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jindec/v55y2007i2p347-371.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

THE ROLE OF EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS IN FACILITATING MARKET TRANSACTIONS -super-

Author

Listed:
  • NIKO MATOUSCHEK
  • PAOLO RAMEZZANA

Abstract

We examine the relationship between market conditions and the adoption of exclusive contracts. In particular, we develop a matching model in which agents may decide to adopt exclusive contracts to reduce bilateral bargaining inefficiencies in the presence of private information. We show that it is optimal for agents to adopt exclusive contracts in thin markets but not in thick markets and that for intermediate levels of market thickness strategic complementarities lead to multiple equilibria. We study the welfare properties of market equilibria and discuss under what circumstances courts should enforce exclusive contracts. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..

Suggested Citation

  • Niko Matouschek & Paolo Ramezzana, 2007. "THE ROLE OF EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS IN FACILITATING MARKET TRANSACTIONS -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 347-371, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:55:y:2007:i:2:p:347-371
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2007.00314.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David de Meza & Mariano Selvaggi, 2004. "Exclusive Contracts Foster Relationship-Specific Investment," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/105, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    2. Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004. "Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem: A Dynamic Perspective," ESE Discussion Papers 100, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Xinyu Hua, 2007. "Strategic ex ante contracts: rent extraction and opportunity costs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 786-803, September.
    2. Holland, Daniel S. & Jannot, Jason E., 2012. "Bycatch risk pools for the US West Coast Groundfish Fishery," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 132-147.
    3. repec:eee:indorg:v:54:y:2017:i:c:p:37-64 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:eee:ijrema:v:31:y:2014:i:3:p:239-252 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Andritsos, Dimitrios A. & Tang, Christopher S., 2010. "Launching new products through exclusive sales channels," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 204(2), pages 366-375, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:55:y:2007:i:2:p:347-371. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.