From the Substance to the Shadow: The Court Embedded into Japanese Labor Markets
The modern contract law generally does not allow a real right to be placed on employees. This constraint makes a claim to the return on employers investment in recruiting and training a worker vulnerable against a possible bystanders infringement on the claim. Accordingly, employers might tend to invest in recruiting and training less than the socially optimal level. Therefore, protection of an employers investment, balanced against mobility of the labor market for better employer-employee matches, is desired. We explore how the Japanese state court in its early period addressed this issue in the labor market of the silk-reeling industry, which led Japans industrialisation, and whose labor market was tight. The court first directly protected interests of employers whose employees were poached, at the expense of workers mobility. Then it came indirectly govern transactions between employers as a shadow off-the-equilibrium path. An employer whose employee was poached and an employer who poached privately negotiated to set tle the poaching dispute, having a possible suit move the disagreement point in favour of the employer whose employee was poached. This indirect governance enabled labor market mobility to some extent with protection of the original employers claim.
|Date of creation:||24 Feb 2014|
|Date of revision:||17 Mar 2016|
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