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Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs

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  • Roberto Burguet

  • Ramon Caminal

Abstract

We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Burguet & Ramon Caminal, 2010. "Simultaneous Nash Bargaining with Consistent Beliefs," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 854.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    • Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:854.10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roberto Burguet & Ramon Caminal, 2015. "Bargaining Failures And Merger Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56(3), pages 1019-1041, August.

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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