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Merger, Ease Of Entry And Entry Deterrence In A Dynamic Model

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  • ANTHONY M. MARINO
  • JÁN ZÁBOJNÍK

Abstract

We analyze whether ease and speed of entry can mitigate the anti‐competititve effects of a merger, in a dynamic model of endogenous merger. In our model, if new firms can enter quickly, it is more likely that merger is motivated by efficiency as opposed to increased market power. Thus, there is less reason to challenge the merger. On the other hand, if entry of new firms becomes less costly, firms may have a stronger incentive to monopolize the industry through horizontal merger. We also show that when the incumbent can engage in entry deterrence activities, anti‐merger policy can decrease welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Anthony M. Marino & Ján Zábojník, 2006. "Merger, Ease Of Entry And Entry Deterrence In A Dynamic Model," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 397-423, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:54:y:2006:i:3:p:397-423
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2006.00294.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 259-327, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Katz, Michael L., 2021. "Big Tech mergers: Innovation, competition for the market, and the acquisition of emerging competitors," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    2. Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Endogenous Mergers and Trade Liberalization," Other publications TiSEM 8b3bda8c-ac25-4522-8090-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Brito, Duarte & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2024. "Can consumer surplus decrease with merger efficiencies?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    4. Mason, Robin & Weeds, Helen, 2013. "Merger policy, entry, and entrepreneurship," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 23-38.
    5. Przemysław Jeziorski, 2023. "Empirical Model of Dynamic Merger Enforcement—Choosing Ownership Caps in U.S. Radio," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4457-4480, August.
    6. Ramón Faulí-Oller & Joel Sandonís, 2007. "Downstream Mergers And Entry," Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-21, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    7. Patrice Bougette & Kai H�schelrath & Kathrin M�ller, 2014. "Do horizontal mergers induce entry? Evidence from the US airline industry," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(1), pages 31-34, January.
    8. Azar, José & Barriola, Xabier, 2022. "Did the MillerCoors joint venture strengthen the craft beer revolution?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    9. Sumit K. Majumdar & Rabih Moussawi & Ulku Yaylacicegi, 2014. "Do Incumbents’ Mergers Influence Entrepreneurial Entry? An Evaluation," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 38(3), pages 601-633, May.

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