IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Depositor Discipline, Regulatory Control, And A Banking Crisis: A Study Of Indian Urban Cooperative Banks


  • Niranjan CHIPALKATTI
  • Meenakshi RISHI


Urban Cooperative banks in India (UCBs) play an important role in mobilizing resources from lower and middle-income groups and in providing direct finance to small entrepreneurs and traders. Motivated by previous empirical work on depositor disciplining behaviour, this paper examines whether depositors punish weak UCBs by withdrawing deposits during and after a banking crisis. In addition, the paper investigates the impact of tightened prudential standards imposed by the Indian central bank (RBI) on the ratio of investments to loan assets and on the rate of growth of loans. Our sample of 45 UCBs is partitioned into strong and weak banks and subjected to econometric testing. Our analysis reveals that a banking crisis is associated with a contraction in deposits across the sample. However, weak banks appear to be disciplined by depositors during election years. We also find weak support for the contention that banks reduced loans when faced with intensified regulatory scrutiny in the aftermath of a crisis. Copyright 2007 The Authors Journal compilation © CIRIEC 2007.

Suggested Citation

  • Niranjan CHIPALKATTI & K. RAMESHA & Meenakshi RISHI, 2007. "Depositor Discipline, Regulatory Control, And A Banking Crisis: A Study Of Indian Urban Cooperative Banks," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 78(4), pages 567-594, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:78:y:2007:i:4:p:567-594

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Maria Semenova & Irina Andrievskaya, 2012. "Are banks peer disciplined? Evidence from post-crisis Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 07/FE/2012, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

    More about this item


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:annpce:v:78:y:2007:i:4:p:567-594. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.