IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The Effects of Pharmaceutical Marketing and Promotion on Adverse Drug Events and Regulation

  • Guy David
  • Sara Markowitz
  • Seth Richards-Shubik

This paper analyzes the relationship between postmarketing promotional activity and reporting of adverse drug reactions (ADRs) by modeling the interaction between a regulator (the FDA) and a pharmaceutical firm. Promotion-driven market expansions enhance profitability yet may involve the risk of inappropriate drug prescriptions, leading to regulatory actions against the firm. We empirically test the relationship between drug promotion and reporting of ADRs using an innovative combination of commercial data on pharmaceutical promotion and FDA data on regulatory interventions and ADRs. We provide some evidence that increased levels of promotion and advertising lead to increased reporting of ADRs for certain conditions. (JEL L51, L65, M31, M37)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

File URL:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 2 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 1-25

in new window

Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:2:y:2010:i:4:p:1-25
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.2.4.1
Contact details of provider: Web page:

More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Kurt R. Brekke & Michael Kuhn, 2005. "Direct to Consumer Advertising in Pharmaceutical Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 1493, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Niklas Rudholm, 2004. "Approval times and the safety of new pharmaceuticals," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 345-350, November.
  3. Cameron,A. Colin & Trivedi,Pravin K., 2005. "Microeconometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521848053.
  4. Nava Ashraf & James Berry & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2010. "Can Higher Prices Stimulate Product Use? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Zambia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2383-2413, December.
  5. Dehez, Pierre & Jacquemin, Alex, 1975. "A Note on Advertising Policy under Uncertainty and Dynamic Conditions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 73-78, September.
  6. Mary K. Olson, 2002. "Pharmaceutical Policy Change and the Safety of New Drugs," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(S2), pages 615-642.
  7. Rizzo, John A, 1999. "Advertising and Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry: The Case of Antihypertensive Drugs," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 89-116, April.
  8. W. David Bradford & Andrew N. Kleit, 2006. "Direct to Consumer Advertising," Chapters, in: The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, chapter 29 Edward Elgar.
  9. Toshiaki Iizuka & Ginger Zhe Jin, 2005. "The Effect of Prescription Drug Advertising on Doctor Visits," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(3), pages 701-727, 09.
  10. Olson, Mary K., 2004. "Are novel drugs more risky for patients than less novel drugs?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 1135-1158, November.
  11. John E. Calfee & Clifford Winston & Randolph Stempski, 2002. "Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and the Demand for Cholesterol-Reducing Drugs," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(S2), pages 673-690.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:2:y:2010:i:4:p:1-25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros)

or (Michael P. Albert)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.