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Excessive Financing Costs in a Representative Agent Framework

Author

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  • Maya Eden

Abstract

This paper highlights a pecuniary externality that results in excessive financing costs. Firms borrow to finance purchases of an inelastically supplied input, bidding up its price. Since higher input prices necessitate more debt obligations, this leads to an increase in intermediation costs. A quantitative interpretation of the model suggests that it is optimal to tax financial intermediation by increasing the borrowing rate by 3 percentage points. (JEL E13, E44, G21, G32, H21, H25)

Suggested Citation

  • Maya Eden, 2016. "Excessive Financing Costs in a Representative Agent Framework," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 215-237, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmac:v:8:y:2016:i:2:p:215-37
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mac.20140147
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Loayza,Norman V. & Ouazad,Amine & Ranciere,Romain, 2017. "Financial development, growth, and crisis: is there a trade-off ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8237, The World Bank.
    2. Maya Eden & Benjamin S. Kay, 2019. "Safe Assets as Commodity Money," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(6), pages 1651-1689, September.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E13 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Neoclassical
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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