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Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés

Author

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  • Luc Behaghel
  • Bruno Crépon
  • Thomas Le Barbanchon

Abstract

We evaluate an experimental program in which the French public employment service anonymized résumés for firms that were hiring. Firms were free to participate or not; participating firms were then randomly assigned to receive either anonymous résumés or name-bearing ones. We find that participating firms become less likely to interview and hire minority candidates when receiving anonymous résumés. We show how these unexpected results can be explained by the self-selection of firms into the program and by the fact that anonymization prevents the attenuation of negative signals when the candidate belongs to a minority. (JEL J15, J68, J71)

Suggested Citation

  • Luc Behaghel & Bruno Crépon & Thomas Le Barbanchon, 2015. "Unintended Effects of Anonymous Résumés," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 1-27, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:7:y:2015:i:3:p:1-27
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/app.20140185
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

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