Elections, Capital Flows, and Politico-economic Equilibria
We study an open economy where a pro-labor and a pro-business candidate compete in an election. The winner chooses taxes, which affect investment returns. Electoral outcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt, but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election. The resulting interaction is novel and has several implications. Elections are associated with increased volatility. Politico-economic crises can occur. Inefficiencies vanish if the candidates commit to an appropriate tax policy, but such commitments have predictable effects on the election. Empirical evidence supporting the theory is discussed. (JEL D72, F34, O17, O19)
Volume (Year): 100 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: https://www.aeaweb.org/subscribe.html|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tillmann, Peter, 2004. "External shocks and the non-linear dynamics of Brady bond spreads in a regime-switching VAR," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 439-454, December.
- Bussiere, Matthieu & Mulder, Christian, 2000.
"Political Instability and Economic Vulnerability,"
International Journal of Finance & Economics,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 5(4), pages 309-330, October.
- Christian B. Mulder & Matthieu Bussière, 1999. "Political Instability and Economic Vulnerability," IMF Working Papers 99/46, International Monetary Fund.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James & Thaicharoen, Yunyong, 2003. "Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 49-123, January.
- Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson & Yunyong Thaicharoen, 2002. "Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth," NBER Working Papers 9124, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Robinson, James A & Thaicharoen, Yunyong, 2002. "Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 3575, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul M Vaaler & Burkhard N Schrage & Steven A Block, 2005. "Counting the investor vote: political business cycle effects on sovereign bond spreads in developing countries," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 36(1), pages 62-88, January.
- Martínez, Juan & Santiso, Javier, 2003. "Financial Markets and Politics: The Confidence Game in Latin American Emerging Economies," MPRA Paper 12909, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Uribe, Martin & Yue, Vivian Z., 2006. "Country spreads and emerging countries: Who drives whom?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 6-36, June.
- Martin Uribe & Vivian Z. Yue, 2004. "Country spreads and emerging countries: who drives whom?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Jun.
- Martin Uribe & Vivian Z. Yue, 2003. "Country Spreads and Emerging Countries: Who Drives Whom?," NBER Working Papers 10018, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Olcay Yucel Culha & Fatih Ozatay & Gulbin Sahinbeyoglu, 2006. "The Determinants of Sovereign Spreads in Emerging Markets," Working Papers 0604, Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
This item is featured on the following reading lists or Wikipedia pages:
- Elections, Capital Flows, and Politico-economic Equilibria (AER 2010) in ReplicationWiki
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:4:p:1759-77. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros)or (Michael P. Albert)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.