Content
October 2012, Volume 153, Issue 1
- 55-68 Revealing information in electoral competition
by Mike Felgenhauer - 69-82 The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests
by Paul Schweinzer & Ella Segev - 83-115 Costs of taxation and the size of government
by Jørgen Andersen - 117-147 Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa
by Paul Collier & Pedro Vicente - 149-161 The evolution of sharing rules in rent seeking contests: Incentives crowd out cooperation
by Heinrich Ursprung - 163-169 Estimation of party positions: A comment on Schofield and Zakharov (2010)
by Monika Turyna - 171-190 Seniority and anti-competitive restrictions on the legislative common pool: tenure’s impact on the overall production of legislation and the concentration of political benefits
by Russell Sobel & Matt Ryan - 191-204 Regulators and Redskins
by Bentley Coffey & Patrick McLaughlin & Robert Tollison - 205-213 Persistent rent extraction
by Leif Helland & Rune Sørensen - 215-233 Determinants of the assignment of EU funds to Portuguese municipalities
by Linda Veiga - 235-249 Correcting mistakes: cognitive dissonance and political attitudes in Sweden and the United States
by Mikael Elinder - 251-252 Shmuel Nitzan: Collective preference and choice
by Daniel Sutter - 253-255 Timothy Besley, Torsten Person: Pillars of prosperity: the political economics of development clusters
by Claudia Williamson - 257-259 Peter J. Boettke: Living economics: yesterday, today, and tomorrow
by Richard Wagner - 261-261 Erratum to: Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements
by Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer
September 2012, Volume 152, Issue 3
- 245-252 Towards a (re-)integration of the social sciences: The Calculus of Consent at 50
by Georg Vanberg & Viktor Vanberg - 253-255 Genesis
by James Buchanan - 257-257 My path to The Calculus of Consent
by Gordon Tullock - 259-263 States without romance
by Richard Adelstein - 265-271 From The Calculus of Consent to extended logrolling, negative externalities, and the Coase theorem
by Peter Bernholz - 273-278 Growing up with The Calculus of Consent
by Roger Congleton - 279-283 From The Calculus of Consent to The Calculus of Dissent: a personal promenade in the constitutional square
by Giuseppe Eusepi - 285-288 From The Calculus of Consent to public choice and to public economics in a public choice approach
by Francesco Forte - 289-292 The Calculus of Consent reflected
by Alan Hamlin - 293-298 Personal reflections on the influence of Buchanan, Tullock, and The Calculus of Consent
by Charles Plott - 299-302 From the Open Society to The Calculus of Consent: a long journey
by Pierre Salmon - 303-309 Public choice and public life
by Randy Simmons - 311-312 1966
by Robert Tollison - 313-321 The Calculus of Consent: some Swedish connections
by Niclas Berggren - 323-327 Public choice and political philosophy
by Loren Lomasky - 329-332 James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and The Calculus
by Dennis Mueller - 333-337 Learning how the world works in order to make it work ‘better’
by Pedro Puy Fraga - 339-344 The Calculus of Consent and real world constitution-making
by Sujai Shivakumar - 345-349 The Calculus of Consent at fifty: the development of public choice in Japan
by Akira Yokoyama - 351-358 Politics-as-exchange and The Calculus of Consent
by Geoffrey Brennan - 359-363 Toward an integrated theory of human cooperation: an ongoing research agenda
by Zhihong Mo - 365-370 The market as a cooperative endeavour
by Robert Sugden - 371-380 Property rights, the social contract and the requirements for democratic government: reflections on The Calculus of Consent
by Dan Usher - 381-388 Methodological and normative individualism in The Calculus
by Viktor Vanberg - 389-392 Redistribution as income insurance?
by Roland Vaubel - 393-396 The Calculus of Consent: a compass for my professional journey
by Richard Wagner - 397-401 Constitutional effectiveness
by Albert Breton - 403-406 Buchanan and Tullock’s apple
by Keith Dougherty - 407-413 Modeling constitutional choice: reflections on The Calculus of Consent 50 years on
by Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard - 415-421 Coercion, the state, and the obligations of citizenship
by Michael Munger - 423-426 The Calculus of Consent: reforming political science
by Peter Ordeshook - 427-431 Buchanan’s opening to constitutional choice and meta-levels of analysis
by Vincent Ostrom - 433-437 Meeting Plato’s challenge?
by Michael Baurmann - 439-443 The consents of The Calculus
by Hartmut Kliemt - 445-449 The unanimity rule revisited: the case of revisions of hybrid constitutions
by Christian Kirchner - 451-453 Markets, votes, and The Calculus of Consent
by Francesco Parisi - 455-459 Constitutional neutrality among economic policies
by Guido Pincione - 461-466 Economics of collective choice—the missing dimension of constitutional theory
by Suri Ratnapala
July 2012, Volume 152, Issue 1
- 3-27 The life and times of Gordon Tullock
by Charles Rowley & Daniel Houser - 29-46 The intellectual legacy of Gordon Tullock
by Charles Rowley - 47-60 Gordon Tullock and Public Choice
by Dennis Mueller - 61-72 Voting methods, problems of majority rule, and demand-revealing procedures
by Michael Munger - 73-82 The economic theory of rent seeking
by Robert Tollison - 83-95 Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock
by Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast - 97-101 Gordon Tullock’s contribution to bureaucracy
by William Niskanen - 103-114 What should government do? Problems of social cost, externalities and all that
by Michael Reksulak & William Shughart - 115-130 Autocracy and coups d’etat
by Ronald Wintrobe - 131-146 The constitutional political economy of Gordon Tullock
by Roger Congleton - 147-161 Towards a theory of bicameralism: the neglected contributions of the calculus of consent
by Bernard Grofman & Thomas Brunell & Scott Feld - 163-180 Tullock on motivated inquiry: expert-induced uncertainty disguised as risk
by David Levy & Sandra Peart - 181-201 Litigation and legal evolution: does procedure matter?
by Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi - 203-210 Gordon Tullock’s contributions to bioeconomics
by Janet Landa - 211-222 Gordon Tullock and experimental economics
by Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann - 223-244 Agent-based modeling, public choice, and the legacy of Gordon Tullock
by Richard Wallick
June 2012, Volume 151, Issue 3
- 409-423 Assessing policy stability in Iraq: a fuzzy approach to modeling preferences
by Peter Casey & Mark Wierman & Michael Gibilisco & John Mordeson & Terry Clark - 425-444 Defensive Politics
by Edward Wesep - 445-464 Efficient public goods provision with incomplete markets
by Greg Hunter - 465-495 Volunteering and the state
by Franz Hackl & Martin Halla & Gerald Pruckner - 497-515 An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions
by Nicolas Olsson-Yaouzis - 517-536 Divided we vote
by Peter Calcagno & Edward Lopez - 537-563 Spend it like Beckham? Inequality and redistribution in the UK, 1983–2004
by Andreas Georgiadis & Alan Manning - 565-584 Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements
by Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer - 585-610 District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes
by Marco Portmann & David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger - 611-630 Inequality, the politics of redistribution and the tax mix
by Jenny Freitas - 631-654 Does immigration weaken natives’ support for the unemployed? Evidence from Germany
by Holger Stichnoth - 655-678 Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis
by Keith Dougherty & Julian Edward - 679-693 Information alliances in contests with budget limits
by Kai Konrad - 695-717 Patriotism, taxation and international mobility
by Salmai Qari & Kai Konrad & Benny Geys - 719-737 Lessons in disguise: multivariate predictive mistakes in collective choice models
by Bruce Desmarais - 739-755 Bargaining and voting
by Dan Usher - 757-787 Axiomatizations of a positional power score and measure for hierarchies
by René Brink & Frank Steffen - 789-806 Last-period problems in legislatures
by Glenn Parker & Matthew Dabros - 807-810 Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki: Majority judgment: measuring, ranking, and electing
by Paul Edelman - 811-812 George G. Szpiro: Numbers rule: the vexing mathematics of democracy, from Plato to the present
by Justin Buchler
April 2012, Volume 151, Issue 1
- 1-21 An evaluation of EU regional policy. Do structural actions crowd out public spending?
by Juan González Alegre - 23-41 Bargaining unexplained
by Dan Usher - 43-61 Incumbent positioning, ideological heterogeneity and mobilization in U.S. House elections
by Michael Ensley - 63-90 Voter uncertainty and failure of Duverger’s law: an empirical analysis
by Michael Herrmann - 91-119 Inequity and risk aversion in sequential public good games
by Sabrina Teyssier - 121-136 Coalition incentives for political budget cycles
by Marek Hanusch - 137-148 Laffer paradox, Leviathan, and political contest
by Toshihiro Ihori & C. Yang - 149-163 Bureaucrats and short-term politics
by Marcus Drometer - 165-183 Fiscal decentralization and natural hazard risks
by Monica Escaleras & Charles Register - 185-192 Islam and democracy
by Niklas Potrafke - 193-214 Social identity and voting behavior
by Avi Ben-Bassat & Momi Dahan - 215-228 Do ideological and political motives really matter in the public choice of local services management? Evidence from urban water services in Spain
by Andrés Picazo-Tadeo & Francisco González-Gómez & Jorge Wanden-Berghe & Alberto Ruiz-Villaverde - 229-254 The economic effects of federalism and decentralization—a cross-country assessment
by Stefan Voigt & Lorenz Blume - 255-270 Determinants of government size: evidence from China
by Alfred Wu & Mi Lin - 271-287 China’s evolution toward an authoritarian market economy—a predator–prey evolutionary model with intelligent design
by Yongjing Zhang - 289-323 European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model
by Ansgar Belke & Barbara Schnurbein - 325-362 Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies?
by Margarita Katsimi & Vassilis Sarantides - 363-397 Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?
by Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm - 399-401 John Meadowcroft: James M. Buchanan
by Randall Holcombe - 403-404 Shmuel Nitzan: Collective preference and choice
by Daniel Sutter - 405-407 Federico Varese: Mafias on the move: how organized crime conquers new territories
by David Skarbek
March 2012, Volume 150, Issue 3
- 399-423 On the political economy and limits of crisis insurance: the case of the 2008–11 bailouts
by Roger Congleton - 425-438 Competition among officials and the abuse of power
by Mikael Priks - 439-467 Uncertainty and ratification failure
by Arzu Kıbrıs - 469-498 The spirits of capitalism and socialism
by Christian Bjørnskov & Martin Paldam - 499-510 Contingent fees meet the British rule: an exploratory study
by Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe - 511-524 The paradox of voting intelligently
by R. Urbatsch - 525-545 The importance of modeling spatial spillovers in public choice analysis
by James LeSage & Matthew Dominguez - 547-559 Consistent allocation of cabinet seats: the Swiss Magic Formula
by Reiner Wolff & Yavuz Karagök - 561-578 Why is there no revolution in North Korea?
by Thomas Apolte - 579-594 How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking
by Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal - 595-608 Deliberation in large juries with diverse preferences
by Patrick Hummel - 609-631 Property rights and competing for the affections of Demos: the impact of the 1867 Reform Act on stock prices
by John Turner & Wenwen Zhan - 633-650 Price-earnings changes during US presidential election cycles: voter uncertainty and other determinants
by John Goodell & Richard Bodey - 651-670 Political parties and political shirking
by Jason DeBacker - 671-690 Corporate governance under proportional electoral systems
by Jaekwon Suh - 691-713 Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints
by Martin Grossmann & Helmut Dietl - 715-730 Military conscription as a means of stabilizing democratic regimes
by Antonis Adam - 731-744 Does social capital increase political accountability? An empirical test for Flemish municipalities
by Dimi Jottier & Bruno Heyndels - 745-769 Net campaign contributions, agricultural interests, and votes on liberalizing trade with China
by John Gilbert & Reza Oladi - 771-792 Voter response to congressional campaigns: new techniques for analyzing aggregate electoral behavior
by Scott Basinger & Damon Cann & Michael Ensley - 793-795 Bo Rothstein: The quality of government: corruption, social trust, and inequality in international perspective
by Robert Lawson - 797-799 Bjorn Erik Rasch and George Tsebelis (eds.): The role of governments in legislative agenda setting
by Matt Ryan
January 2012, Volume 150, Issue 1
- 1-25 Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)
by Nicholas Miller - 27-49 The influence of auditor term length and term limits on US state general obligation bond ratings
by Mark Schelker - 51-75 Length of compulsory education and voter turnout—evidence from a staged reform
by Panu Pelkonen - 77-95 Fiscal effects of budget referendums: evidence from New York school districts
by Phuong Nguyen-Hoang - 97-117 Communication in committees: who should listen?
by Elisabeth Schulte - 119-135 Land inequality and conflict intensity
by Giacomo Luca & Petros Sekeris - 137-154 Balancing constituency representation and party responsiveness in the US Senate: the conditioning effect of state ideological heterogeneity
by Jeffrey Harden & Thomas Carsey - 155-179 Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951–2006
by Niklas Potrafke - 181-193 Electoral terms and terrorism
by Roland Hodler & Dominic Rohner - 195-208 Coyote ugly: the deadweight cost of rent seeking for immigration policy
by Benjamin Powell - 209-240 The information content of elections and varieties of the partisan political business cycle
by Cameron Shelton - 241-261 Positive versus normative economics: what’s the connection? Evidence from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy and the General Social Survey
by Bryan Caplan & Stephen Miller - 263-282 Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences
by Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti - 283-308 Is tolerance good or bad for growth?
by Niclas Berggren & Mikael Elinder - 309-326 Public and private sector wages interactions in a general equilibrium model
by Gonzalo Fernández-de-Córdoba & Javier Pérez & José Torres - 327-362 Does information increase political support for pension reform?
by Tito Boeri & Guido Tabellini - 363-383 A comparison of cumulative voting and generalized plurality voting
by Duane Cooper & Arthur Zillante - 385-385 Erratum to: An economic analysis of voting in Sweden
by Henrik Jordahl - 387-389 Roger D. Congleton: Perfecting parliament: constitutional reform, liberalism, and the rise of Western democracy
by Randall Holcombe - 391-394 Jonathan Bendor, Daniel Diermeier, David A. Siegel, and Michael M. Ting: A behavioral theory of elections
by Arye Hillman - 395-398 Arye L. Hillman: Public finance and public policy: responsibilities and limitations of government
by Randall Holcombe
December 2011, Volume 149, Issue 3
- 225-234 The many faces of counterterrorism: an introduction
by Todd Sandler - 235-261 Lock, stock, and barrel: a comprehensive assessment of the determinants of terror
by Martin Gassebner & Simon Luechinger - 263-280 Who adopts MIND/FIND in INTERPOL’s fight against international crime and terrorism?
by Walter Enders & Todd Sandler - 281-295 Counterterror intelligence operations and terror attacks
by Jonathan Feinstein & Edward Kaplan - 297-314 The illicit drug trade, counternarcotics strategies and terrorism
by James Piazza - 315-335 Terrorism, democratization, and US foreign policy
by Navin Bapat - 337-363 Does terror increase aid?
by Axel Dreher & Andreas Fuchs - 365-381 Can peace be purchased? A sectoral-level analysis of aid’s influence on transnational terrorism
by Joseph Young & Michael Findley - 383-403 Earthquakes, hurricanes, and terrorism: do natural disasters incite terror?
by Claude Berrebi & Jordan Ostwald - 405-425 Linguistic polarization and conflict in the Basque Country
by Javier Gardeazabal - 427-440 Social cohesion and self-sacrificing behavior
by Hirofumi Shimizu - 441-463 Terrorist group survival: ideology, tactics, and base of operations
by S. Blomberg & Khusrav Gaibulloev & Todd Sandler - 465-478 Counterterrorism strategies in the lab
by Daniel Arce & Sneha Bakshi & Rachel Croson & Catherine Eckel & Enrique Fatas & Malcolm Kass
October 2011, Volume 149, Issue 1
- 1-3 Public choice in a local government setting
by Randall Holcombe - 5-30 Does fiscal decentralization constrain Leviathan? New evidence from local property tax competition
by George Crowley & Russell Sobel - 31-48 The impact of fiscal decentralization on economics performance in high-income OECD nations: an institutional approach
by Whitney Buser - 49-64 Municipal debt in Switzerland: new empirical results
by Lars Feld & Gebhard Kirchgässner & Christoph Schaltegger - 65-74 The cartelization of local governments
by Randall Holcombe & DeEdgra Williams - 75-88 The role of income in the formation of new cities
by Lawrence Kenny & Adam Reinke - 89-108 Do housing bubbles generate fiscal bubbles?
by Razvan Vlaicu & Alexander Whalley - 109-132 City government structure: are some institutions undersupplied?
by William Doerner & Keith Ihlanfeldt - 133-149 The productivity of elected and appointed officials: the case of school superintendents
by Mark Partridge & Tim Sass - 151-165 Municipal corporations, economic calculation, and political pricing: exploring a theoretical antinomy
by Richard Wagner - 167-185 Social capital, lobbying and community-based interest groups
by Emily Chamlee-Wright & Virgil Storr - 187-207 Why local governments do not maximize profits: on the value added by the representative institutions of town and city governance
by Roger Congleton - 209-224 Quasimarket failure
by Peter Boettke & Christopher Coyne & Peter Leeson
September 2011, Volume 148, Issue 3
- 269-281 Tullock challenges: happiness, revolutions, and democracy
by Bruno Frey - 283-312 The limited effects of testimony on political persuasion
by Brendan Nyhan - 313-335 Economic freedom, culture, and growth
by Claudia Williamson & Rachel Mathers - 337-351 Resource allocation and voter calculus in a multicandidate election
by M. Roth - 353-380 On the looting of nations
by Mare Sarr & Erwin Bulte & Chris Meissner & Tim Swanson - 381-393 Proportional versus winner-take-all electoral vote allocations
by Patrick Hummel - 395-418 Protest voting in plurality elections: a theory of voter signaling
by Daniel Kselman & Emerson Niou - 419-434 On disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry
by Qiang Fu & Qian Jiao & Jingfeng Lu - 435-443 The Condorcet jury theorem and extension of the franchise with rationally ignorant voters
by Ruth Ben-Yashar & Mor Zahavi - 445-457 Strategic voting in open primaries: evidence from Rush Limbaugh’s “operation chaos”
by E. Frank Stephenson - 459-470 Power comes with responsibility—or does it?
by Friedel Bolle & Claudia Vogel - 471-490 Government fragmentation versus fiscal decentralization and corruption
by Rajeev Goel & Michael Nelson - 491-503 Imposing a turnout threshold in referendums
by Yoichi Hizen & Masafumi Shinmyo - 505-530 Oil and the duration of dictatorships
by Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Harald Oberhofer & Paul Raschky - 531-546 Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government
by David Granlund - 547-559 Political competition and politician quality: evidence from Italian municipalities
by Maria Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa - 561-567 Monopoly vs. competition in light of extraction norms
by Arkadi Koziashvili & Shmuel Nitzan & Yossef Tobol - 569-594 Globalization, welfare regimes and social protection expenditures in Western and Eastern European countries
by Markus Leibrecht & Michael Klien & Oezlem Onaran - 595-610 Do electoral institutions have an impact on population health?
by Simon Wigley & Arzu Akkoyunlu-Wigley