Tullock on motivated inquiry: expert-induced uncertainty disguised as risk
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 152 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Gordon Tullock; Michael Polanyi; Truth seeking; Scientific faction; Analytical egalitarianism; B31; B41; D78; D82;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- Roger Koppl, 2011. "Against representative agent methodology," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 43-55, March.
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