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Gordon Tullock’s contribution to bureaucracy

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  • William Niskanen

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Suggested Citation

  • William Niskanen, 2012. "Gordon Tullock’s contribution to bureaucracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 97-101, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:152:y:2012:i:1:p:97-101
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9851-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gordon Tullock, 1974. "Dynamic hypothesis on bureaucracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 127-131, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jeaneth Johansson & Malin Malmström & Joakim Wincent, 2021. "Sustainable Investments in Responsible SMEs: That’s What’s Distinguish Government VCs from Private VCs," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-22, January.
    2. Henrik Egbert & Teodor Sedlarski, 2020. "The foundations of contemporary economics: Gordon Tullock and public choice," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 107-118.
    3. Bruno S. Frey & Lasse Steiner, 2014. "God does not play dice, but people should: random selection in politics, science and society," ECON - Working Papers 144, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    4. Bruno S. Frey & Lasse Steiner, 2014. "Random Selection in Politics, Science and Society: Applications and Institutional Embeddedness," CREMA Working Paper Series 2014-09, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    5. Sechindra Vallury & Bryan Leonard, 2022. "Canals, climate, and corruption: The provisioning of public infrastructure under uncertainty," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 221-252, March.

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