God does not play dice, but people should: random selection in politics, science and society
AbstractThis paper discusses and proposes random selection as a component in decision-making in society. Random procedures have played a significant role in history, especially in classical Greece and the medieval city-states of Italy. We examine the important positive features of decisions by random Mechanisms. Random processes allow representativeness with respect to individuals and groups. They significantly reduce opportunities to influence political decisions by means of bribery and corruption and decrease the large expenses associated with today’s democratic election campaigns. Random mechanisms can be applied fruitfully to a wide range of fields, including politics, the judiciary, the economy, science and the cultural sector. However, it is important that random selection processes are embedded in appropriately designed institutions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics - University of Zurich in its series ECON - Working Papers with number 144.
Date of creation: Mar 2014
Date of revision:
Random selection; lot; democracy; representativeness; corruption;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-03-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-03-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HPE-2014-03-22 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-POL-2014-03-22 (Positive Political Economics)
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