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Public bureau budgets and jurisdiction size: An empirical note

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  • David Nellor

Abstract

This note suggests that the persuit of budget maximization by public bureaus is partially dependent on the size of the jurisdiction in which the bureau is located. The larger is the jurisdiction, the greater is the degree of rational ignorance and the more significant are moving costs, each of which contribute to bureau monopoly power. The additional monopoly power in larger jurisdictions provides the incentive for, and enables, the bureau personnel to exert greater pressure on politicians to expand bureau budgets and benefits to personnel. Our examination of police services showed these hypotheses to be consistent with the evidence. In particular, the size of budgets grew far more rapidly than did population, and the proportion of public employees proved to be a significant variable where personnel expenditures were considered. Copyright Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984

Suggested Citation

  • David Nellor, 1984. "Public bureau budgets and jurisdiction size: An empirical note," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 175-183, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:42:y:1984:i:2:p:175-183
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124159
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joseph F. Quinn, 1979. "Wage Differentials among Older Workers in the Public and Private Sectors," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 14(1), pages 41-62.
    2. George Stigler, 1972. "Economic competition and political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 91-106, September.
    3. Thomas Dilorenzo, 1981. "An empirical assessment of the factor-supplier pressure group hypothesis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 559-568, January.
    4. L. R. Gabler, 1969. "Economies and Diseconomies of Scale in Urban Public Sectors," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 45(4), pages 425-434.
    5. Gordon Tullock, 1974. "Dynamic hypothesis on bureaucracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 127-131, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Buettner, Thiess & Holm-Hadulla, Fédéric, 2013. "City size and the demand for local public goods," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 16-21.

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