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The consents of The Calculus

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  • Hartmut Kliemt

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  • Hartmut Kliemt, 2012. "The consents of The Calculus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 439-443, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:152:y:2012:i:3:p:439-443
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9996-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buchanan,James M. & Congleton,Roger D., 2006. "Politics by Principle, Not Interest," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521031325.
    2. Kliemt, Hartmut, 1994. "The Calculus of Consent after Thirty Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 341-353, June.
    3. James M. Buchanan, 1987. "Justification of the Compound Republic: The Calculus in Retrospect," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 7(2), pages 305-312, Fall.
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