Laffer paradox, Leviathan, and political contest
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 151 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Laffer paradox; Leviathan; Political contest; Revenue-maximizing rate; D72; F20; H41; H71;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
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