Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 151 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Pareto optimality; k-majority rule; Spatial voting; D7; C61;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
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- Gode, D.K. & Sunder, S., 1991. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero Intelligence (Z1) Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," GSIA Working Papers 1992-16, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
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