Direct Democracy and the Stability of State Policy
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 050615.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-07-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-07-21 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MAC-2006-07-21 (Macroeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Massimo Morelli & Michele Tertilt, 2000. "Policy Stability under Different Electoral Systems," Working Papers 00-13, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
- Houser, Daniel & Freeman, John, 2001. "Economic Consequences of Political Approval Management in Comparative Perspective," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 692-721, December.
- McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
- Peter Bernholz, 1978. "On the stability of logrolling outcomes in stochastic games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 65-82, January.
- Schofield, Norman, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 575-94, October.
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