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Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock

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  • Kenneth Shepsle
  • Barry Weingast

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  • Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 2012. "Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 83-95, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:152:y:2012:i:1:p:83-95
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9853-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Diermeier, Daniel & Feddersen, Timothy J., 1998. "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 611-621, September.
    3. Gely, Rafael & Spiller, Pablo T., 1992. "The political economy of supreme court constitutional decisions: The case of Roosevelt's court-packing plan," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 45-67, March.
    4. Weingast, Barry R & Marshall, William J, 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 132-163, February.
    5. Moe, Terry M., 1985. "Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 1094-1116, December.
    6. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    7. Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 85-104, March.
    8. Cameron, Charles M. & Cover, Albert D. & Segal, Jeffrey A., 1990. "Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(2), pages 525-534, June.
    9. Shepsle, Kenneth A & Weingast, Barry R, 1982. "Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 367-371, May.
    10. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
    11. Nolan McCarty, 2004. "The Appointments Dilemma," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 413-428, July.
    12. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    13. Gordon Tullock, 1967. "The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(2), pages 256-270.
    14. Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
    15. Caldeira, Gregory A & Wright, John R & Zorn, Christopher J W, 1999. "Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 549-572, October.
    16. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    17. Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1984. "Political Solutions to Market Problems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 417-434, June.
    18. Riker, William H., 1982. "The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 753-766, December.
    19. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014. "Empirical social choice: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 297-310, March.
    2. Thompson Fred & Rizova Polly, 2015. "How Government Creates Value?," Economic Themes, Sciendo, vol. 53(4), pages 449-466, December.
    3. Roel Beetsma & Alex Cukierman & Massimo Giuliodori, 2016. "Political Economy of Redistribution in the United States in the Aftermath of World War II--Evidence and Theory," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 1-40, November.
    4. Robi Ragan, 2015. "Computational social choice," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 5, pages 67-80, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Peter J. Boettke & Henry A. Thompson, 2022. "Identity and off-diagonals: how permanent winning coalitions destroy democratic governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 483-499, June.
    6. Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & José Carlos Tello, 2014. "The Political Economy of Growth, Inequality, the Size and Composition of Government Spending," Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers 2014-380, Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.

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