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The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition: Instability, Institutions, and Information

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  • D Austen-Smith

    (Department of Economics, University of York, York Y01 5DD, England)

Abstract

The author reviews the literature on the spatial theory of electoral competition, initiated by Downs. Two main lines of inquiry are distinguished. The first is concerned with the purely analytical properties of majority preference as an aggregation rule for mapping individual preferences into social preferences. And the second is devoted to providing explanations of the choices of political decisionmakers, and the consequences of these choices, within a simple plurality electoral system. These two lines are intimately related and in the review the author seeks to explore this relationship.

Suggested Citation

  • D Austen-Smith, 1983. "The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition: Instability, Institutions, and Information," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 1(4), pages 439-460, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:envirc:v:1:y:1983:i:4:p:439-460
    DOI: 10.1068/c010439
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth A. Shepsle, 1970. "A Note on Zeckhauser's "Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives": The Case of the Paradox of Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(4), pages 705-709.
    2. Linda Cohen & Steven Matthews, 1980. "Constrained Plott Equilibria, Directional Equilibria and Global Cycling Sets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(5), pages 975-986.
    3. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 511-514, March.
    5. Dunleavy, Patrick & Ward, Hugh, 1981. "Exogenous Voter Preferences and Parties with State Power: Some Internal Problems of Economic Theories of Party Competition," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 351-380, July.
    6. Hinich, Melvin J., 1977. "Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 208-219, December.
    7. Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1970. "Plurality Maximization vs Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(3), pages 772-791, September.
    8. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    9. Denzau, Arthur T. & Parks, Robert P., 1979. "Deriving public sector preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 335-352, June.
    10. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    11. Riker, William H., 1982. "The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 753-766, December.
    12. Davis, Otto A. & Hinich, Melvin J. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1970. "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 426-448, June.
    13. Otto Davis & Melvin Hinich, 1968. "On the power and importance of the mean preference in a mathematical model of democratic choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 59-72, September.
    14. Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
    15. Gordon Tullock, 1981. "Why so much stability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 189-204, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dhillon, Amrita, 2003. "Political Parties and Coalition Formation," Economic Research Papers 269591, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.

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