Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa
AbstractPost-Soviet African democratization has introduced elections into contexts that often lack restraints upon the behavior of candidates, resulting in the emergence of voter intimidation, vote-buying, and ballot fraud. We propose a model of electoral competition where, although some voters oppose violence, it is effective in intimidating swing voters. We show that in equilibrium a weak challenger will use violence, which corresponds to a terrorism strategy. Similarly, a nationally weak incumbent will use repression. However, a stronger incumbent facing local competition will prefer to use bribery or ballot fraud. We discuss the applicability of the model to several African elections. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 153 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Violence; Fraud; Vote-buying; Electoral politics; Political economy; Sub-Saharan Africa; D72; O55; P16;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O55 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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wpdea1210, Department of Applied Economics at Universitat Autonoma of Barcelona.
- Roxana Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012. "An Inquiry into the Use of Illegal Electoral Practices and Effects of Political Violence," CSAE Working Paper Series 2012-16, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
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