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Regulators and Redskins

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  • Bentley Coffey
  • Patrick McLaughlin
  • Robert Tollison

Abstract

We examine the correlation between federal government activity and performance of the capital’s National Football League team, the Washington Redskins. We find a positive, non-spurious, and robust correlation between the Redskins’ winning percentage and bureaucratic output, measured by pages published in the Federal Register. Because the Redskins’ performance is prototypically exogenous, we give this result a causal interpretation and provide a plausible, causal mechanism: bureaucrats must make “logrolling” deals to expand their regulatory power, and a winning football team offers a shared source of optimism to lubricate such negotiations. We do not find the same correlation when examining congressional activity. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Bentley Coffey & Patrick McLaughlin & Robert Tollison, 2012. "Regulators and Redskins," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 191-204, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:153:y:2012:i:1:p:191-204
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9781-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Miguel Espinosa, 2021. "Labor Boundaries and Skills: The Case of Lobbyists," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1586-1607, March.
    2. Sanchari Choudhury, 2021. "Regulation and Corruption: Evidence from the United States," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 83(4), pages 897-934, August.
    3. Dima Yazji Shamoun & Bruce Yandle, 2016. "Asserting presidential preferences in a regulatory review bureaucracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 87-111, January.
    4. James B. Bailey & Diana W. Thomas, 2017. "Regulating away competition: the effect of regulation on entrepreneurship and employment," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 237-254, December.
    5. Patrick A. McLaughlin & Oliver Sherouse, 2019. "RegData 2.2: a panel dataset on US federal regulations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(1), pages 43-55, July.
    6. Jerry Ellig & Patrick A. McLaughlin, 2016. "The Regulatory Determinants of Railroad Safety," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(2), pages 371-398, September.
    7. Michelson, Noam, 2023. "The revolving door of former civil servants and firm value: A comprehensive approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    8. Noam Michelson, 2022. "Do Former Civil Servants Affect a Firm’s Value and Credit Spreads?," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2022.02, Bank of Israel.
    9. Joshua C. Hall & Donald J. Lacombe & Joylynn Pruitt, 2017. "Collective bargaining and school district test scores: evidence from Ohio bargaining agreements," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(1), pages 35-38, January.
    10. Rui Du & Junfu Zhang, 2022. "Super bowl participation and the local economy: Evidence from the stock market," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 1513-1545, December.
    11. Sean E. Mulholland, 2019. "Stratification by regulation: Are bootleggers and Baptists biased?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(1), pages 105-130, July.
    12. Noam Michelson, 2022. "Firms’ Public Administration Connections in Israel: An Overview," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2022.03, Bank of Israel.
    13. Omar Al‐Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, 2017. "RegData: A numerical database on industry‐specific regulations for all United States industries and federal regulations, 1997–2012," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(1), pages 109-123, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Regulation; Regulations; Regulation quality; Federal regulations; Federal Register; Rulemaking; Wage hedonics; Compensating differential; Logrolling; Football; Redskins; Washington Redskins; Government performance; Regulatory output; Regulators; H11; L51; L83; L88;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • L88 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Government Policy

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