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Rent Seeking and Hidden In-Kind Resource Distortion: Some Empirical Evidence

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  • Mixon, Franklin G, Jr
  • Laband, David N
  • Ekelund, Robert B, Jr

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  • Mixon, Franklin G, Jr & Laband, David N & Ekelund, Robert B, Jr, 1994. "Rent Seeking and Hidden In-Kind Resource Distortion: Some Empirical Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 1717-1785, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:78:y:1994:i:2:p:1717-85
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Gentier & Giuseppina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2006. "The Question of the Rent Dissipation in the Notes Issuance Activity: The Case of the Italian Banking System before the Creation of the Bank of Italy," CAE Working Papers 45, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
    2. Antoine Gentier & Giusepina Gianfreda & Nathalie Janson, 2011. "Rent dissipation or government predation ? The notes issuance activity in Italy 1865-1882," Post-Print hal-00735325, HAL.
    3. Fernando del Río, 2021. "The impact of rent seeking on social infrastructure and productivity," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 1741-1760, August.
    4. Zeeshan Noor Siddiqui, 2017. "Understanding the Linkage among Public Procurement (PP), Corruption, and Tax Morale (TM) Through Agency Theory (AT): A Review," Business & Economic Review, Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan, vol. 9(3), pages 258-288, September.
    5. J. Zachary Klingensmith, 2019. "Political Entrepreneurs and Pork-Barrel Spending," Economies, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-17, February.
    6. McChesney Fred S., 1998. "Devaluing Deregulation," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 8(4), pages 1-22, December.
    7. Arteaga, Fernando & Desierto, Desiree & Koyama, Mark, 2024. "Shipwrecked by rents," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    8. Franklin Mixon & Russell McKenzie, 1996. "Learning to rent-seek: collective action and in-kind benefits in the public sector," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(12), pages 755-757.
    9. Franklin G. Mixon, 2018. "Camaraderie, common pool congestion, and the optimal size of surf gangs," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 381-396, November.
    10. Facchini, François & Melki, Mickaël, 2013. "Efficient government size: France in the 20th century," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 1-14.
    11. Patrick A. McLaughlin & Adam C. Smith & Russell S. Sobel, 2019. "Bootleggers, Baptists, and the risks of rent seeking," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 211-234, June.
    12. Franklin Mixon, 2002. "Social security trust fund flows and the welfare costs of rent seeking," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(8), pages 975-979.
    13. David N. Laband & John P. Sophocleus, 2019. "Measuring rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 49-69, October.
    14. Franklin G. Mixon, 1994. "What Can Regulators Regulate," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 403-414, October.
    15. François Facchini & Mickaël Melki, 2011. "Optimal Government Size and Economic Growth in France (1871-2008): An explanation by the State and Market Failures," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11077, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    16. Bentley Coffey & Patrick McLaughlin & Robert Tollison, 2012. "Regulators and Redskins," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 191-204, October.
    17. Russell Sobel & J. Clark & Dwight Lee, 2007. "Freedom, barriers to entry, entrepreneurship, and economic progress," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 20(4), pages 221-236, December.
    18. Ayça Tekin-Koru, 2006. "Corruption and the ownership composition of the multinational firm at the time of entry: Evidence from Turkey," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 30(2), pages 251-269, June.

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